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alyze the empirical research that has been done regarding the
practical consequences of the guilty but mentally ill laws.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Punishment deters not only sane men but also eccentric men, whose supposed involuntary acts are really

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/3

2

McGraw et al.: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Plea and Verdict: Current State of th

1985]

GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

produced by a diseased brain capable of being acted
upon by external influence.
A knowledge that they would be protected by an acquittal on the grounds of insanity will encourage these
men to commit desperate acts, while on the other hand
certainty that they will not escape punishment will terrify
them into a peaceful attitude-toward others.
Queen Victoria, 18821

T

HE criminal law's efforts to place mentally disabled defendants in a separate category from other defendants can be
traced back centuries. 2 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the criminal law of England treated the insane much as they
are treated today in the United States-a successful insanity defense resulted in acquittal and, usually, confinement in a mental
3
hospital.
Throughout its history, the insanity defense has faced opposition. One form of opposition has been the adoption of an alternative verdict that acknowledges a defendant's unsound mind at
the time of the misconduct yet does not absolve him or her of
criminal responsibility. Such a verdict may either supplant or
supplement the verdict of "not guilty be reason of insanity."
Queen Victoria's displeasure with the acquittal by reason of insanity of notorious defendants like James Hadfield, who in 1800
attempted to murder King George III, 4 Daniel M'Naghten, who in
1843 attempted to assassinate the British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, 5 and Roderick MacLean, who in 1882 attempted to kill
Queen Victoria herself, 6 led to passage of the Trial of Lunatics
1. Letter from Queen Victoria to Prime Minister Gladstone (April 23,
1882), quoted in N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 189 (1968).
2. See D.H.L. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE:
CAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1983) (reviewing the

PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORI-

evolution and justification
of the insanity defense through a discussion of responsibility and punishment
theories in criminal law); N. WALKER, supra note 1 (tracing the history of the
English penal system's approach to the insanity defense from the tenth to the
twentieth century).
3. See Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94.
4. Hadfield's Case, 27 St. Tr. [Howell] 1281 (K.B. 1800).
5. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
6. See Robey, Guilty But Mentally Ill, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 374,
377 (1978); S.L. Golding & C. Roberts, The Interface of Ethical and Clinical
Decision-Making: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of the Attribution of
Criminal Responsibility 7-8 (1984) (available from Dep't of Psychology, Univ. of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (unpublished manuscript).
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Act in 1883. 7 This act supplanted the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity with that of "guilty but insane." 8
Almost a hundred years passed before any jurisdiction in the
United States followed the English lead by adopting an alternative verdict. In 1975, in response to extreme public outcry over
the release of approximately 150 insanity acquittees following the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v. McQuillan,9 Michigan became the first state to enact a "guilty but mentally ill"
(GBMI) statute.' 0 This enactment has served as a prototype for
other states. By 1984, eleven states had followed Michigan's lead
and adopted a GBMI verdict to be considered alongside the traditional verdicts of guilty, not guilty, and not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI).I At least eleven other states have considered or
are considering adopting similar legislation. 12 In 1982, numer7. Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 38 (repealed by Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act, 1964, ch. 84).
8. Id. Under this act, a person determined to be "insane, so as not to be
responsible, according to law, for his actions at the time when the act was done"
would be found "guilty of the act or omission charged against him, but ...
insane ... at the time when he did the act or made the omission." Id. § 2(1). A
person receiving this special verdict was to be "kept in custody as a criminal
lunatic" in accordance with the same "rules or orders ... having reference to a
person or persons acquitted on the ground of insanity." Id. § 2(2), (4). Thus, a
"guilty but insane" finding had the same dispositional consequences as a "not
guilty by reason of insanity" verdict; both resulted in acquittal. See id. § 2(4). It
is therefore arguable whether the Trial of Lunatics Act of 1883 effected any
more than a change in semantics. See Felstead v. Rex, 1914 A.C. 534 (guilty but
insane verdict is an acquittal, not a conviction).
9. 393 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974). For a discussion of McQuillan,
see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
10. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, No. 180, § 36, 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 387 (codified
at MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.36 (1982)). For an account of the GBMI verdict's
development in Michigan, see Project, EvaluatingMichigan's Guilty but Mentally Ill
Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 77, 80-85 (1982) (for purposes
of clarity, textual references to this authority will be to Gare Smith and James
Hall, the student authors of this study).
11. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (Supp. 1984); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 408 (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 115-2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-2-1 (West
Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 504.120 (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3

(1984); 18

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-7-2

314 (Purdon 1983); 1984 S.C. Acts 396; S.D.
(Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1

(Supp. 1983).
12. See, e.g., S.B. 323, 7th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982) (defeated in committee); H.B. 710, 7th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982) (defeated in committee);
S.B. 2073-80, 10th Reg. Sess. (Hawaii 1980) (passed House, defeated in Senate
committee); H.F. 24, 70th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1983) (legislation withdrawn); S.B. 806, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1978); S.B. 11765, 203d Sess. (N.Y. 1980);
S.B. 4013, 202d Sess. (N.Y. 1979); S.B. 7185, 201st Sess. (N.Y. 1978); H.B.
9705, 201st Sess. (N.Y. 1978); S.B. 148, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1982) (defeated in committee); S.B. 297, 113 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
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ous bills that included various versions of the GBMI verdict were
introduced in the United States Congress.' 3 The ready acceptance of the GBMI verdict by twelve states within the short span of
eight years has made it the most popular of the proposed solu4
tions to perceived defects in the traditional insanity defense.'
Unlike the NGRI and "guilty but insane" verdicts, which hold
the defendant blameless,' 5 a GBMI verdict holds the defendant
criminally responsible for the offense. Thus, it allows imposition
of the same sentence that could be given a defendant found guilty
of the offense, yet promises mental health evaluation or treatment
during the term of the sentence. Prompted by highly publicized
cases, usually resulting in acquittals of defendants perceived to be
threats to public safety yet found to be insane, legislators hoped
that the GBMI verdict would offer juries an attractive alternative
to the NGRI verdict and thereby prevent the early release of dangerous insanity acquittees.' 6
Despite its rapid adoption in twelve states, the GBMI verdict
has been criticized roundly by scholars and professionals as conceptually flawed and procedurally problematic. Several profes17
sional organizations have taken positions opposing the verdict.
1979); S.B. 169, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1979) (referred to study in the Senate); H.B.
234, 57th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1983) (defeated in committee); H.B. 398, Reg.
Sess. (Va. 1982) (defeated in committee); S.B. 107, 66th Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
1983) (amended by committee, reported to Senate, rejected at third reading).
13. See, e.g., S. 2672, H.R. 5395, H.R. 6653, H.R. 6702, H.R. 6709, H.R.
6716, H.R. 6717, H.R. 6718, H.R. 6726, H.R. 6742, H.R. 6947, H.R. 6949, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For a reference to congressional hearings on the GBMI
verdict, see infra note 33.
14. A few states have adopted laws reminiscent of the Trial of Lunatics Act
of 1883. For a discussion of this act, see supra note 7-8 and accompanying text.
Maryland has judicially developed a "guilty but insane" verdict. For a discussion
of this verdict, see infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. Oregon now has a
"guilty except for insanity" verdict. See H.B. 2075, 62d Or. Legis. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (1983). Connecticut enacted and later repealed a "guilty but not criminally responsible" verdict. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13 (Supp. 1983)
(amended 1983). After repealing this verdict, the Connecticut legislature reenacted the earlier affirmative defense that defendant "lacked substantial capacity,
as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law." Com-

pare id. with

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 53a-13 (1972). All these verdicts have the same

dispositional consequences as an NGRI verdict.
15. For a discussion of these exculpating verdicts, see supra notes 8, 11-12
& 14 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of dangerousness of acquittees as a motive for
GBMI legislation, see infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
17. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON Ass'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT: CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS

295-97

(1983) (Standard 7-6.10(b) (forms of verdict) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDING COMM.]; NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF
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The American Bar Association, for example, has adopted as an
official policy the standard recommended by its Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice. The Committee recommended that "[s]tatutes which supplant or
supplement the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity with a
verdict of guilty but mentally ill should not be enacted."' 8 The
commentary accompanying this standard concludes:
The "guilty but mentally ill" verdict offers no help
in the difficult question of assessing a defendant's criminal responsibility. This determination in insanity cases is
essentially a moral judgment. If in fact the defendant is
so mentally diseased or defective as to be not criminally
responsible for the offending act, it would be morally obtuse to assign criminal liability. The "guilty but mentally
ill" verdict also lacks utility in the forward-looking determination regarding disposition. Guilty defendants
should be found guilty. Disposition questions, including
questions concerning the appropriate form of correctional treatment, should be handled by the sentencing
tribunal and by correctional authorities. Enlightened societal self-interest suggests that all felony convicts
should receive professional mental health and mental retardation screening and that, whenever indicated, those
convicts should receive mental health therapy. Identifying convicts in need of such treatment or habilitation
and following up that identification process with actual
treatment has nothing to do with the form of verdict. 19
Except for a recently completed study of Michigan's GBMI
verdict, 20 no empirical data on the operation and practical consequences of the GBMI plea and verdict have been reported. Indeed, beyond law review articles on the statutory provisions of a
few states, 2 1 no comprehensive picture of the GBMI plea and ver32-34 (1983); American Psychiatric
Ass'n, Statement on the Insanity Defense (Dec. 1982), published in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1984); American Psychological
Ass'n, Text of Position on Insanity Defense, 15(3) APA MONITOR 11 (1984).
18. ABA STANDING COMm., supra note 17, at 295. This standard reflects the
policy enacted by the ABA's House of Delegates on February 9, 1983.
19. Id. at 297.
20. See Project, supra note 10.
21. Because Michigan has had the longest experience with the GBMI verdict, its statute~s have been the subject of the most extensive legal analyses. See,
e.g., Brown & Wittner, 1978 Annual Survey of Michigan Law: Criminal Law, 25
THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
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dict as currently used by the adopting states has been offered.
The purpose of this article is to present a comprehensive description of the current state of the knowledge about the GBMI
plea and verdict. Three sources of knowledge will be explored:
statutory law, case law, and social science research. The first section of this article describes the relevant substantive standards,
definitions, and procedural mechanics of the GBMI plea and verdict as prescribed by the statutes of the states that have enacted
GBMI legislation. The accompanying tables present the various
GBMI laws, allow a comparison of provisions for the plea and verdict across jurisdictions, and provide guidance for those legislatures considering adoption of GBMI statutes or modification of
existing GBMI provisions. The second section briefly traces the
judicial development of the GBMI laws as expressed in appellate
court rulings. Finally, as a prelude to a more systematic study of
the uses and consequences of the GBMI plea and verdict as envisioned by a number of professional groups, 2 2 the third section
reviews the current state of empirically-based research in this area
and discusses the salient issues surrounding the operation of the
GBMI plea and verdict that warrant more extensive study.
L. REV. 335 (1979); Corrigan & Grano, 1976 Annual Survey of Michigan
Law: Criminal Law, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 473 (1977); Sherman, Guilty But Mentally
Ill: A Retreatfrom the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237 (1981); Van Hoek,
1980 Annual Survey of Michigan Law: CriminalLaw, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 657 (1981);
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J.
URB. L. 471 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Historical and Constitutional
Analysis]; Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1979); Comment,
The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 188 (1978); Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis, 14 RUTGERS L.J.
453 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, GBMI].
Reviews of GBMI provisions in other states, however, have begun to appear
in law reviews. See, e.g., Stelzner & Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Plea
in New Mexico, 13 N.M.L. REV. 99 (1983); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill A
Reasonable Compromisefor Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 289 (1981); Comment,
Guilty But Mentally Ill: Broadening the Scope of Criminal Responsibility, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 797 (1983); Note, Indiana'sGuilty But Mentally Ill Statute: Blueprint to Beguile the
Jury, 57 IND. L.J. 639 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indiana's GBMI].
22. The American Psychiatric Association's Committee on Legal Issues, for
example, adopted the recommendation that the APA "reserve judgment about
use of the verdict of guilty but mentally ill to supplement the verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity until such time as empirical research on the effects of this
supplementary verdict form is available." American Psychological Ass'n, More on
Insanity Reform, Div. of Psychology and Law Newsletter, Summer 1983, at 6, 7,
col. 1 (emphasis in original). See also NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH Ass'N, supra note 17,
at 44; I. KEILITZ &J.P. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 46 (1984).
WAYNE
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LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Legislative Purposes

The GBMI concept made its debut in the United States in
1975 when Michigan enacted its GBMI statute.2 3 The primary
purposes of the legislation were to curtail the assertion of the insanity defense, to reduce the incidence of insanity acquittals, and
to protect society by incarcerating mentally disturbed, dangerous
defendants who might otherwise be found NGRI and released
shortly thereafter. 24 In People v. McQuillan,25 the Michigan
Supreme Court struck down the state's automatic commitment
statute because it provided stricter standards and procedures for
insanity acquittees than for persons civilly committed as dangerous and mentally ill. The court ordered that the approximately
270 insanity acquittees, 26 previously committed automatically,
and still hospitalized at that time, be provided judicial hearings to
ensure that they met the civil commitment standards (present
mental illness, dangerousness, or inability to meet basic needs). 2 7
Many of the patients were subsequently released because they
failed to meet these criteria for involuntary civil commitment. 28
Shortly after their release, two former patients committed violent
crimes; one raped two women and the other murdered his wife.
The resulting public outcry spurred the Michigan legislature to
29
adopt the GBMI plea and verdict.
In 1981, largely in response to a highly publicized case in
which the defendant raised the insanity defense after committing
a violent offense,3 0 Indiana became the second state to enact
GBMI legislation.3 1 Similarly, the trial and acquittal of John W.
23. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, No. 180, § 36, 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 387 (codified
at MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 768.36 (1982)) (defendant may be found "guilty but
mentally ill" if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) "is guilty of an offense;" (2) "was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense;" and (3) "was not legally insane at the time of the
commission of that offense").
24. See Project, supra note 10, at 83-85.

25. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
26. See Project, supra note 10, at 82.
27. 392 Mich. at 547, 221 N.W.2d at 586.
28. See Project, supra note 10, at 82-83.
29. Id. See also Comment, Historical and ConstitutionalAnalysis, supra note 21,

at 482-83.
30. State v. Judy, - Ind. -, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981). See Note, Indiana's
GBMI, supra note 21, at 639.
31. Act of Sept. 1, 1982, 1981 Ind. Acts 298, § 4 (codified at IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-35-2-1 (West Supp. 1984)).
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Hinckley, Jr. for his shooting of President Ronald Reagan 32 apparently influenced many federal and state legislators to intro3
duce GBMI legislation. 3
Related to the legislative intent to close the perceived loophole whereby responsible defendants escape punishment for their
misconduct is the intent to offer juries a compromise verdict permitting both condemnation of a defendant's actions and acknowledgment of his or her need for mental health treatment. 34 The
Michigan Court of Appeals has stated that the GBMI verdict was
enacted as an "in-between classification." 3 5 Jurors reaching this
verdict could feel satisfied that the public was protected and that
the defendant would be provided with treatment. Jurors reportedly have felt constrained by the limited choice between acquittal
on the grounds of insanity and a finding of guilty. 36 For example,
when questioned about their decision following John Hinckley's
trial, several jurors stated they would have preferred having the
37
option of a GBMI verdict available to them.
The treatment and punishment goals of the GBMI verdict
have been seriously questioned on both conceptual and practical
grounds. For example, the National Mental Health Association
has stated:
[The GBMI] verdict does not ensure in any way that persons found guilty under it, as opposed to persons found
simply guilty, will be treated any differently when the
trial is over. If persons convicted under either statute
are treated the same in terms of disposition, we have developed different verdicts without any distinction. This
32. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding
Hinckley NGRI).
33. See Note, GBMI, supra note 21, at 453 n.3 ("The dissatisfaction with the
Hinckley verdict created an atmosphere that was ripe for adoption of alternatives to the insanity defense. The day after the Hinckley verdict, the Delaware
legislature passed a bill adopting the GBMI verdict."). See also Limiting the Insanity Defense: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995,
S. 2658, S.2669) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings]; The Insanity Defense:
HearingsBefore the Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (hearings on
S.818, S.1106, S.1558, S.2669, S.2672, S.2678, S.2745, S.2780) [hereinafter
cited as Committee Hearings].
34. See Note, Indiana's GBMI, supra note 21, at 645-46.
35. People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 246, 263 N.W.2d 44, 45 (1977).
36. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 144-45 (1967).
For a further discussion of jury decisionmaking in insanity cases, see infra notes
293-315 and accompanying text.
37. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 33, at 155-70.
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may further mislead juries into believing that a "guilty
but mentally ill" verdict will somehow insure treatment
38
and at the same time protect the community.
B.

Current GBMI Statutes

Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the GBMI statutes of twelve states
in effect at this writing.3 9 The tables reveal basic similarities as
well as critical differences among the versions of the GBMI plea
and verdict adopted by the twelve states. For the sake of clarity
and brevity, many of the entries in the tables have been abridged
or paraphrased. Special care has been taken, however, either to
duplicate the wording of a particular statutory passage or to paraphrase its meaning precisely, especially if shades of meaning may
be particularly important, as in the statutory standards and definitions presented in Table 1.
Provisions relating to an individual state's GBMI plea and
verdict may appear in several places in that state's statutes. Except for the NGRI provisions in Table 1, a statutory provision is
noted in the tables only if the state has a relevant provision that
expressly applies to GBMI defendants or convicts. Provisions not
explicitly applicable to GBMI defendants or convicts are not included even though, in practice, they may apply. For example,
the general sentencing provisions to which all offenders, not just
38. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH Ass'N, supra note 17, at 34. Another commentator has noted that:
[the GMBI verdict] implies a false promise to the jury that a guilty but
mentally ill defendant will be punished for his crime and at the same
time compassionately treated for his mental illness, thereby satisfying
competing social policies of the criminal law-responsibility and treatment. However, such a ruling in actuality guarantees no such treatment for defendants convicted under it. A "guilty but mentally ill"
offender is simply a "guilty" offender for purposes of disposition upon
conviction.
Note, Indiana's GBMI, supra note 21, at 646. For a further discussion of criticism
of the GBMI verdict, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
39. In constructing the tables, the most current versions of the relevant
statutes available to the authors were used. The tables give statutory citations by
section number only, without identifying the statutory compilations or indicating the year of the volume, replacement volume, supplement, or legislative service. The citations refer to the following compilations, which are current
through the volume indicated: ALASKA STAT. (1983 Advance Legislative Service,
II); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. (West Supp. 1984);
Ky. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1983 Legis. Ser., III Purdon); 1984 S.C.
Acts 396; S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. (Supp.
1983).
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those found GBMI, are subject are not reflected in Table 3. Similarly, entries under "Probation" and "Parole" are included only if
special provisions are made for GBMI offenders.
Table 1 is meant to facilitate comparison of the GBMI and
NGRI statutory standards and definitions applicable in the twelve
states. In Alaska, Delaware, and South Carolina, for example, a
defendant may not be found NGRI on the ground that he or she
lacked the behavioral control to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law, but may be found GBMI on that basis.
The GBMI standards of these three states thus encompass a much
broader concept of mental disease or defect than do the NGRI
standards; the GBMI concept includes characterizations of "irresistible impulse" and "volitional capacity," while the NGRI concept focuses instead on the extent to which a defendant could
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 40 Illinois, on the
other hand, allows a finding of NGRI on the basis of volitional
impairment, but disallows a finding of GBMI on that basis. The
NGRI and GBMI verdicts in these states thus appear to be uniformly distinguishable by the types of mental aberration upon
which they can be based. In Alaska, Delaware, and South Carolina, but not in Illinois, criminal responsibility may be assigned to
a defendant even if he or she suffered from mental aberration that
impaired behavioral control or willpower. Whether such basic
similarities and sharp distinctions among the formulations of the
GBMI verdict reflect different legislative purposes is unclear. It is
also unclear whether juries and judges will be any better than the
legislatures at sorting out the types and degrees of mental impair41
ment applicable to the GBMI and NGRI verdicts.
40. See ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 17, at 264-73 (in 1983, the ABA
endorsed an NGRI standard that focused on the lack of "appreciation" of criminal wrongdoing and rejected "volitional" incapacity as an independent basis for
exulpation).
41. See Stelzner & Piatt, supra note 21, at 106. In discussing the similarities
and differences between the GBMI and NGRI verdicts, the authors state that:
[t]he jury's meaningful choice between the two verdicts might be difficult due to the jury's confusion over the similarities and differences in
the definitions of the two alternatives. Both verdicts require two showings-a mental condition and a consequence caused by that condition.
The conditions may be similar; the requisite results quite different.
Id. See also Note, GBMI, supra note 21, at 471 ("The overlap of these definitions
makes a meaningful choice between the two verdicts a difficult task to assign to a
lay jury.").
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Tables 2 and 3 present special GBMI procedural provisions
that apply from the initial pleading stage through the ultimate release of an offender. Table 2 differentiates the procedures applicable when a defendant pleads GBMI from those applicable when
a defendant does not enter such a plea but the court or jury instead finds him or her GBMI after trial. Prerequisites to the
court's acceptance of a GBMI plea are very different from the prerequisites to a GBMI finding in most states. The provisions relating to the burden of proof regarding mental illness reflected in
Table 2 are illustrative of the variety of GBMI statutes among the
twelve states. Only Kentucky and South Carolina specify which
party bears the burden of proof; six states require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, three require a preponderance of the evidence,
and three are silent on the issue.
Table 3 presents statutory provisions applicable during the
time of sentencing, incarceration, and the eventual release of an
offender by means of probation and parole. Of particular note
are the uniform provisions among the states allowing imposition
on a GBMI convict of any sentence that could be imposed on any
other defendant convicted of the same offense. That the GBMI
sentencing provisions do not expressly preclude imposition of the
death penalty may present the courts with a conflict between the
rehabilitative ideals of the GBMI legislation and the possible im42
position of the death penalty.
The next section of this article explores the judicial development of the GBMI plea and verdict. Most of the cases discussed
therein resulted from conflicts or questions arising after GBMI
legislation was enacted in a particular state.
III.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

As of the fall of 1984, approximately 90 appellate level decisions involving or discussing the GBMI plea or verdict have been
rendered in this country. 43 The vast majority of these decisions
42. For a further discussion of the relationship between the death penalty
and GBMI legislation, see infra note 122.
43. See Gorton v. Johnson, 100 F.R.D. 801 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Ball v. State,
167 Ga. App. 546, 306 S.E.2d 353 (1983) (the state statute requires the trial
judge to instruct the jury that "not guilty by reason of insanity" and "guilty but
mentally ill" verdicts are part of the jury's choices), rev'd, 251 Ga. 840, 310
S.E.2d 516 (1984); Jackson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 477, 304 S.E.2d 560 (1983)
(although mentally ill at the time the offense was committed defendant is guilty
because he knew the difference between right and wrong); Kirkland v. State, 166
Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983) (use of "guilty but mentally ill" verdict was
not an unconstitutional application of ex postfacto law); People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill.
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understandably come from Michigan, the state having the longest
App. 3d 723, 463
2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983); People v. De Wit, 123 Ill.
N.E.2d 742 (1984); People v. Neely, 121 Ill. App. 3d 616, 459 N.E.2d 1115
App. 3d 780, 452 N.E.2d 583 (1983); People v.
(1984); People v. Gore, 116 Ill.
Lillard, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 449 N.E.2d 938 (1983); People v. Dalby, 115 Ill.
App. 3d 35, 450 N.E.2d 31 (1983) (no ex postfacto limitation applies to the verdict
of guilty but mentally ill); People v. Marshall, 114 Ill. App. 3d 217, 448 N.E.2d
969 (1983) (GBMI defendants have "no separate constitutional right to treatment for their mental health problem beyond the constitutional right to minimally adequate medical care which is applicable to all prisoners"); People v.
Testa, 114 Ill. App. 3d 695, 449 N.E.2d 164 (1983) (defendant cannot ask for a
subsequent hearing to determine mental status, and therefore cannot be found
guilty but mentally ill if he did not initially plead insanity); Schiro v. State, Ind. -, 451 N.E.2d 1047, cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 510 (1983); Taylor v. State, Ind. -, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982) (the definitions of "insane" and "mentally ill"
are not so vague and susceptible to misinterpretation so as to render them the
same); Turner v. Turner, - Ind. App. -, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (1983); Stader v.
State, - Ind. App. -, 453 N.E.2d 1032 (1983); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607
S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); Pouncey v. State, 297
Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983) (deciding whether a defendant can be found both
guilty of a crime and insane at the time of commission); Langworthy v. State, 284
Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979); People v. Robinson, 417 Mich. 231, 331 N.W.2d
226 (1983); People v. Murphy, 416 Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152 (1982) (the
"prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of
fact that the defendant was sane at the time he committed the acts alleged");
People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982); People v. Booth,
414 Mich. 343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982) (a defendant who suffers from amnesia
regarding events of the crime may enter plea of guilty but mentally ill); People v.
Cocuzza, 413 Mich. 78, 318 N.W.2d 465 (1982), rev'g 105 Mich. App. 761, 307
N.W.2d 414 (1981); People v. McDonald, 409 Mich. 110, 293 N.W.2d 588
(1980), aff'g 86 Mich. App. 5, 272 N.W.2d 179 (1978); People v. McLeod, 407
Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980) (a constitutional statute cannot be rendered
unconstitutional simply because the Department of Corrections failed to comply
with the statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment of GBMI defendant);
People v. Helzer, 404 Mich. 410, 273 N.W.2d 44 (1978); People v. Darden, 132
Mich. App. 154, 346 N.W.2d 915 (1984); People v. John, 129 Mich. App. 664,
341 N.W.2d 861 (1983); People v. Williams, 129 Mich. App. 648, 341 N.W.2d
854 (1983) (per curiam); People v.-Siebers, 129 Mich. App. 465, 341 N.W.2d
530 (1983); People v. Doyle, 129 Mich. App. 145, 342 N.W.2d 560 (1983); People v. Clark, 129 Mich. App. 119, 341 N.W.2d 248 (1983); People v. Kinard, 129
Mich. App. 94, 341 N.W.2d 820 (1983); People v. Toner, 125 Mich. App. 439,
336 N.W.2d 22 (1983) (a writ of mandamus, rather than a hearing before a sentencing court, is the proper remedy for a complaint of insufficient treatment for
a GBMI defendant); People v. Delaughter, 124 Mich. App. 356, 335 N.W.2d 37
(1983); People v. Caldwell, 122 Mich. App. 618, 333 N.W.2d 105 (1983); People
v. Davis, 122 Mich. App. 597, 333 N.W.2d 99 (1983); People v. Wehrer, 121
Mich. App. 501, 329 N.W.2d 37 (1982); People v. Leblanc, 120 Mich. App. 343,
327 N.W.2d 471 (1982); People v. Frost, 120 Mich. App. 328, 328 N.W.2d 44
(1982); People v. Fisher, 119 Mich. App. 445, 326 N.W.2d 537 (1982); People v.
Korona, 119 Mich. App. 369, 326 N.W.2d 143 (1982); People v. Gasco, 119
Mich. App. 143, 326 N.W.2d 397 (1982) (per curiam); People v. Smith, 119
Mich. App. 91, 326 N.W.2d 434 (1982); People v. Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252,
324 N.W.2d 593 (1982); People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 210, 323 N.W.2d
656 (1982); People v. Shively, 116 Mich. App. 323, 323 N.W.2d 383 (1982);
People v. Blue, 114 Mich. App. 137, 318 N.W.2d 498 (1982); People v. Bazzi,
113 Mich. App. 606, 318 N.W.2d 484 (1981) ("[b]efore accepting the plea of
[GBMI] the court must directly question the defendant to determine whether he
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experience with the alternative verdict. Many of these decisions
is guilty of the offense"); People v. Linzey, 112 Mich. App. 374, 315 N.W.2d 550
(1981); People v. Fultz, 111 Mich. App. 587, 314 N.W.2d 702 (1981) (the court
must determine that the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the offense for the GBMI verdict to apply: insanity is an "extreme of mental illness");
People v. Broadnax, 111 Mich. App. 46, 314 N.W.2d 522 (1981); People v.
Rone, 109 Mich. App. 702, 311 N.W.2d 835 (1981); People v. Henry, 107 Mich.
App. 632, 309 N.W.2d 922 (1981); People v. Ritsema, 105 Mich. App. 602, 307
N.W.2d 380 (1981) (although jury instruction that failed to include GBMI verdict was erroneous, retrial was unnecessary because jury found defendant sane
and treatment could be provided if deemed necessary by Department of Corrections); People v. Gasco, 104 Mich. App. 594, 305 N.W.2d 552 (1981); People v.
Mack, 104 Mich. App. 560, 305 N.W.2d 264 (1981) (remand for determination
of whether defendant was receiving proper treatment); People v. Rone, 101
Mich. App. 811, 300 N.W.2d 705 (1980), vacated, 411 Mich. 984, 311 N.W.2d
702 (1981); People v. Murphy, 100 Mich. App. 413, 299 N.W.2d 51 (1980) (because prosecution failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, GBMI verdict has to be reversed and the case remanded for an entry of NGRI), aff'd, 416
Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152 (1982); People v. Drossart, 99 Mich. App. 66, 297
N.W.2d 863 (1980) (in terms of criminal responsibility, definitions of mental
illness must come from the law, not the medical sciences); People v. Philpot, 98
Mich. App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980); People v. Hicks, 96 Mich. App. 610,
293 N.W.2d 646 (1980); People v. Girard, 96 Mich. App. 594, 293 N.W.2d 639
(1980) (the jury instruction on the definition of legal insanity was erroneous because the definition was based on common law rather than statutory language);
People v. Willsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 292 N.W.2d 145 (1980); People v.
Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 292 N.W.2d 523 (1980); People v. Seefeld, 95
Mich. App. 197, 290 N.W.2d 123 (1980); People v. Gemill, 95 Mich. App. 139,
290 N.W.2d 104 (1980); People v. Parney, 98 Mich. App. 571, 296 N.W.2d 568
(1979); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223 (1979) (reversal was not warranted by defendant's complaint of improper psychiatric treatment; the proper remedy was a writ of mandamus to Department of
Corrections); People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979);
People v. Crawford, 89 Mich. App. 30, 279 N.W.2d 560 (1979) (a defendant may
be found legally sane if he has the "substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct" and has the ability "to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law"); People v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892
(1979); People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978) (defendant is
not necessarily entitled to treatment because the GBMI verdict is based on a
finding of mental illness at the time the offense was committed and not thereafter);
People v. Long, 86 Mich. App. 676, 273 N.W.2d 519 (1978) (the procedure for
making a GBMI plea is the same as that for making a guilty plea except for the
additional finding of mental illness), rev'd sub nom. People v. Booth, 414 Mich.
343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982); People v. Booth, 86 Mich. App. 646, 273 N.W.2d
510 (1978) (a preliminary examination transcript does not establish a factual
basis for defendant's GBMI plea), rev'd, 414 Mich. 343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982);
People v. Mangiapane, 85 Mich. App. 379, 271 N.W.2d 240 (1978); People v.
Staggs, 85 Mich. App. 304, 271 N.W.2d 211 (1978); People v. Mikulin, 84 Mich.
App. 705, 270 N.W.2d 500 (1978); People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 267
N.W.2d 472 (1978) (the verdicts of GBMI and NGRI do not unconstitutionally
shift the burden of proof on defendant because the burden is on the people to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane); People v. Jackson,
80 Mich. App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1977); People v. McLeod, 77 Mich. App.
327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), afd, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980);
Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978); State v. Page, 100
N.M. 788, 676 P.2d 1353 (1984); State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 466, 659 P.2d 918
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concern issues having little, if any, significance to the development of the GBMI plea and verdict. 4 4 This section reviews only
those appellate court pronouncements that apparently are significant regarding the constitutionality, as well as the substantive and
procedural development, of the GBMI plea and verdict. First,
however, we contrast the American progeny of the English Trial
45
of Lunatics Act.
A.

Maryland's "Guilty But Insane" Verdict

The Maryland Court of Appeals has recognized a "guilty but
insane" verdict on two occasions. Although at first glance this
judicially-fashioned verdict appears to be similar to GBMI, more
careful scrutiny reveals that it is essentially equivalent to the traditional NGRI verdict. In Langworthy v. State,4 6 the court found that
a guilty verdict is not inconsistent with a special verdict of insanity. The issue before the court was whether the intermediate
appellate court had erred in dismissing the defendant's appeal
from a rape conviction on the grounds that the trial court's special finding of insanity was tantamount to an acquittal. 4 7 In holding that the conviction was appealable, the court of appeals
stated: "[T]he clear legislative intent regarding the successful interposition of a plea of insanity is not that an accused is to be
found not guilty of the criminal act it was proved he committed,
but that he shall not be punished therefor. ' '4 8 The court also
cited Maryland Rule of Procedure 731a, which states that a defendant "may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. In addition to any of these pleas, the defendant may interpose the defense of insanity as permitted by
law." 49 Thus, although the court held that a defendant found
guilty of the crime charged, yet successful in asserting an insanity
(1983); Commonwealth v. Musolino, 320 Pa. Super. 425, 467 A.2d 605 (1983);
State v. Stacy, 601 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1980).
44. See, e.g., People v. Cocuzza, 413 Mich. 78, 318 N.W.2d 465 (1982)
(whether trial judge who presided over prior incomplete guilty plea proceedings
must sua sponte disqualify himself from conducting the same defendant's subsequent bench trial); People v. McDonald, 409 Mich. 110, 293 N.W.2d 588 (1980)
(whether usage and application of common law definition of rape to only male
defendants represent an arbitrary classification and violate due process).
45. For a discussion of the Trial of Lunatics Act, see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
46. 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979).
47. Id. at 598-99, 399 A.2d at 583-84.
48. Id. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1972)
(repealed 1982).
49. 284 Md. at 591-92, 399 A.2d at 580.
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defense, could appeal from the conviction, implicit in that holding is a finding that a guilty verdict is not inconsistent with an
insanity verdict.
In Pouncey v. State, 50 the Maryland Court of Appeals held specifically that a defendant may be found guilty but insane. The defendant had drowned her five-year-old son because she believed
that the devil was pursuing him and that the only way to prevent
her son from going to hell was to kill him. In holding that the
defendant was properly found both guilty of murder and legally
insane at the time of the offense, the court relied on the rationale
of Lang-worthy and stated that "a finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea, or inconsistent with a general
intent to commit a crime." 5 '
Bearing a striking similarity to the nineteenth century Trial of
Lunatics Act, 52 Maryland's judicially-developed guilty but insane
verdict appears merely to replace the NGRI language with language that suggests blameworthiness. The dispositional consequences of a guilty but insane finding are not different from those
of a finding of NGRI. 5 3 Although predicated on a finding of guilt,
the consequences are nonresponsibility for the criminal conduct
and no punishment under the criminal law. The court, in its discretion, may either release the defendant or commit him or her
for treatment in a mental institution until it is determined that
release would not constitute a danger to the individual or
others.54 Semantics aside, Maryland's judicially-developed guilty
but insane verdict is clearly distinguishable from the legislativelydeveloped GBMI verdict described in the previous section of this
article, 55 and it is almost indistinguishable from the traditional
NGRI verdict that the GBMI verdict was meant to supplement.
The same is true of the Oregon and Connecticut variations of the
guilty but insane verdict. 56 We now turn to the judicial development of the GBMI plea and verdict.
50. 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983).
51. Id. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
52. For a discussion of the Trial of Lunatics Act, see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
53. See Langworthy, 284 Md. at 593-94, 399 A.2d at 581-82.
54. Id. at 594, 399 A.2d at 582.
55. For a discussion of the legislative development of the GBMI verdict, see
supra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of the Oregon and Connecticut versions, see supra note
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B.

ConstitutionalQuestions

Constitutional challenges to GBMI statutes have ranged from
equal protection and due process arguments to arguments based
on prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and ex post
facto laws. These challenges have been predicated on both federal
and state constitutional protections. 5 7 The relevant Michigan case
law addresses the issues of equal protection, 58 due process, 59 and
cruel and unusual punishment. 60 Indiana case law deals only with
equal protection 6 ' and due process challenges, 6 2 while Illinois
63
case law reveals challenges based on due process guarantees
and the federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. 64 Georgia case law involves only ex post facto law challenges. 65 To date, the Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan statutes
have withstood constitutional attack in the supreme courts of
those states, 66 while the Georgia statute has been reviewed only
67
by the intermediate appellate court.
57. For example, in a 1978 decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the Michigan GBMI statute was violative of
the Michigan Constitution's single object clause, Article 4, Section 24, which
required that no law embrace more than one object. People v. Sharif, 87 Mich.
App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978). The defendant argued that the statute provided for both treatment and parole of GBMI offenders. Id. at 199, 274 N.W.2d
at 19. The court stated that a statute may include provisions that implement its
principal object, which, in this case, was to provide for judgments and sentences
of offenders. Id.
In other cases, defendants have asserted concurrent violations of state and
federal constitutional provisions. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 114 Ill. App. 3d
217, 448 N.E.2d 969 (1983) (defendant argued GBMI statute was violative of
state and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws).
58. See, e.g., People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980);
People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978); People v. Darwall,
82 Mich. App. 652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978).
59. See People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 651, 288 N.W.2d 909,914 (1980)
(court addressed whether defendant, who did not receive psychiatric treatment,
was denied due process of law under statute specifically granting to GBMI defendants the right to such treatment).
60. See id. at 651, 288 N.W.2d at 914.
61. See Taylor v. State, - Ind. -, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982).
62. See id. at -, 440 N.E.2d at 11-11.
63. See People v. De Wit, 123 Ill. App. 3d 723, 463 N.E.2d 742 (1984); People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983).
64. See People v. De Wit, 123 Ill. App. 3d 723, 463 N.E.2d 742 (1984); People v. Dalby, 115 Ill. App. 3d 35, 450 N.E.2d 31 (1983); People v. Marshall, 114
Ill. App. 3d 217, 448 N.E.2d 969 (1983).
65. See Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
66. See People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983); Taylor v.
State, - Ind. -, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982); People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632,
288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
67. See Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
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1. Equal Protection
The basic premise of equal protection challenges against
GBMI statutes is that they create irrational classifications leading
to discrimination against defendants found GBMI. 68 In Michigan,

a variety of equal protection arguments have been advanced. In
People v. Darwall,6 9 for example, the defendant argued that it was
discriminatory to subject mentally ill defendants pleading insanity
to the risk of GBMI verdicts, while similar defendants may escape
GBMI verdicts by not pleading insanity. 70 The court of appeals
rejected this argument, stating that the statute bears a reasonable
relationship to the state's valid interests in protecting the public
71
and in treating mentally ill criminals.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected another equal protection argument in People v. Sharif.7 2 The defendant contended

that he was denied equal protection because he did not receive a
hearing before treatment, yet prisoners transferred to the department of mental health were entitled to such hearings. 7 3 The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that the purpose of such
a hearing was to determine if treatment could best be provided by
a mental health facility rather than a correctional facility and that
74
GBMI offenders did receive evaluations before treatment.
Thus, the court stated, it was reasonable for the legislature to require a hearing only for those offenders whom corrections offi75
cials were considering transferring to a mental health facility.
A third general type of equal protection challenge, based on
the overlap of definitional criteria for NGRI and GBMI, is that no
reasonable basis exists for allowing the incarceration of GBMI defendants and the exculpation of NGRI defendants. The Michigan
68. See People v. Rone, 109 Mich. App. 702, 715-16, 311 N.W.2d 835, 841
(1981); People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 472, 280 N.W.2d 565, 566 (1979);
People v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 359-60, 276 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1979); People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 661, 267 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1978); People v.
Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 245-46, 263 N.W.2d 44, 44-45 (1977).
69. 82 Mich. App. 652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978).
70. Id. at 661, 267 N.W.2d at 476.
71. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals previously had stated that the legislature need not provide an all-inclusive classification for defendants who are
both guilty and mentally ill. People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 245-46, 263
N.W.2d 44, 45 (1977).
72. 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978).
73. Id. at 200, 274 N.W.2d at 19-20.
74. Id. at 200-01, 274 N.W.2d at 20.
75. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/3

32

McGraw et al.: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Plea and Verdict: Current State of th

1985]

GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

76
Court of Appeals considered this argument in People v. Sorna.
The defendant claimed that it was "irrational to consider a defendant found 'mentally ill' to be criminally responsible for his
acts while excusing a person adjudged 'legally insane' from similar responsibility." 77 The court rejected this contention and held
that the GBMI statute merely established an "intermediate category to deal with situations where a defendant's mental illness
does not deprive him of substantial capacity sufficient to satisfy
the insanity test . ... The fact that these distinctions may not
appear clear cut does not warrant a finding of no rational basis to
"..."78
make them .
79
A similar argument was rejected in Indiana in Taylor v. Slate.
In Taylor, the defendant argued that Indiana's GBMI statute violated his equal protection and due process rights because "the
definitions of 'insanity' and 'mentally ill' are so vague and susceptible to misinterpretation by persons of ordinary intelligence that
the verdicts [of NGRI and GBMI] are one and the same." 80 In
rejecting this challenge, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated that
even though the two definitions 8 ' involve similar behavioral char-

76. 88 Mich. App. 351, 359-60, 276 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1979). See also People v. Darden, 132 Mich. App. 154, 346 N.W.2d 915 (1984).
77. 88 Mich. App. at 360, 276 N.W.2d at 896.
78. Id. In holding that these admittedly vague and allegedly "irrational"
distinctions were necessary and therefore legitimate, the court cited the language of a 1973 United States Supreme Court decision: "The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accomodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific." Id. (quoting McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)).
79. - Ind. -, -, 440 N.E.2d 1109, 1111-13 (1982).
80. Id.at -,440 N.E.2d at 1111. According to the defendant, the vagueness of statutory terms necessarily resulted in an "arbitrary and selective application of the two subsections," while denying him reasonable notice of the
charge against him and subjecting him "to the whim of the jury." Id.
81. Indiana's statutory definition of "insanity" is included within its insanity
defense as follows:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(b) "Mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.
IND. CODE § 35-41-3-6 (1978). "Mentally ill," on the other hand, is defined as
follows:
["Mentally ill" means having] a psychiatric disorder which substantially
disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the person's ability to function. For the purposes of this chapter, "mental[ly]
illf]" may include ... any mental retardation, alcoholism, or addiction
to narcotics or dangerous drugs.
Id. § 16-14-9.1-(a) (1984), cited in id. § 35-5-2-3(c) (1978).
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acteristics, the two do not describe the same mental condition. 8 2
Thus, although the two terms do overlap, "the existence of a
mental disease or deficiency does not ipsofacto render a defendant
83
legally insane."
In People v. Kaeding,84 the defendant raised a fourth type of
equal protection argument by asserting that the applicable statutes invidiously discriminated against incarcerated GBMI offenders vis-a-vis GBMI probationers. The defendant construed the
applicable statutes as requiring the sentencing court to prescribe
the specific mental health treatment for every GBMI offender not
sentenced to prison but giving the Department of Corrections the
discretion to treat or not to treat GBMI inmates. 8 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant
had misconstrued the provisions which required only that the
probationer submit to treatment. 86 The court said that the only
difference between the way incarcerated and nonincarcerated defendants are treated is that the entity empowered to make treatment decisions is different in each case. It added that allocation
of this decisionmaking power to the entity having custody and responsibility for supervising the offender was rationally related to
one of the purposes of the statutes, that is, to "prescribe sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses and permit
the recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders."' 87 The court found that no fundamental
right or suspect classification was involved and accordingly held
that the statutes did not deprive GBMI inmates of equal protec88
tion of the laws.
82. - Ind. at -,440 N.E. at 1111.
83. Id. The court noted that "legal" insanity only had meaning when evaluated in the context of criminal intent, stating that "[flor purposes of criminal
law, the focal point always has been whether any particular defendant acted with
the intent and culpability for which the imposition of criminal penalties was justified." Id.
84. 98 Ill. 2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983).
85. Id. at 244, 456 N.E.2d at 15-16.
86. Id. at 244-45, 456 N.E.2d at 16. In rejecting the defendant's interpretation of the statute, the court reasoned as follows: "In our judgment the legislature did not intend that either the court or the Department would be required to
utilize limited resources, facilities and skilled personnel in treating those defendants, imprisoned or otherwise, for whom treatment would not be helpful." Id.
87. Id. at 247, 456 N.E.2d at 17 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001-12(a) (1981)).
88. Id. The court limited its analysis to determining whether the statute was
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Close scrutiny of statutes to insure that they are "tailored narrowly" to a state purpose, according to the court,
was reserved for cases in which the legislation either threatened fundamental
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In People v. McLeod,8 9 the Michigan Supreme Court seemingly
laid to rest all possible equal protection challenges to that state's
GBMI statute. The defendant in McLeod claimed that the legislatively-created GBMI classification must be substantially related to
a compelling state interest, not just rationally related as required
by the court of appeals in Darwall and Soma.90 The court found,
however, that because persons found GBMI necessarily have been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, they have "no right to
the exercise of unfettered liberty." 9 ' Similarly, the "mentally ill"
classification has none of the marks of a suspect class. 9 2 Consequently, the classification did not deprive those found GBMI of
any fundamental right nor did it implicate any special status that
would require strict scrutiny by the courts. The court held, therefore, that the constitutionality of the GBMI classification must be
upheld if it rationally furthers the legislative objective. 93 The
court found that "this classification rationally furthers the legislative object of providing supervised mental health treatment and
94
care to guilty but mentally ill defendants."
2.

Due Process

The GBMI statutes of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois have
thus far withstood due process challenges. 9 5 In Michigan, these
challenges have been based on People v. McQuillan9 6 and federal
authority, 9 7 both of which suggest that insanity acquittees are enconstitutional rights or was directed at a particular "suspect" group. Id. at 24546, 456 N.E.2d at 16.
89. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
90. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 69-71 & 76-78 and accompanying text.
91. 407 Mich. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919.
92. Id. The court listed the "traditional indicia of suspectness" as follows:
"[T]he class is saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id. n.9.
93. Id. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919. Strict scrutiny of the Michigan statute
would probably have led to different results in McLeod and the prior equal protection cases because the statute was admittedly underinclusive.
94. Id.
95. See People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983); Taylor v.
State, - Ind. -, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982); People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632,
288 N.W.2d 909 (1980); People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17
(1978).
96. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974). For a discussion of McQuillan,
see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
97. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3

152

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 117

titled to hearings regarding their then-present mental conditions
before being sentenced to involuntary mental treatment because
insanity at the time of the offense cannot be presumed to continue to the time of sentencing. The defendant in People v. McLeod
argued that due process entitled GBMI defendants to a
presentence hearing regarding present mental condition.98 The
Michigan Supreme Court rejected this argument by distinguishing between the liberty interests of GBMI convicts and NGRI acquittees. The court stated that NGRI acquittees are entitled to
such a hearing under McQuillan because an NGRI verdict only establishes a reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's sanity at the
time of the crime. Thus, involuntary commitment of NGRI acquittees without a finding regarding present mental condition
constitutes a significant restriction on their right to liberty, a right
that GBMI convicts do not possess because they "have been
found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been 1) guilty of an
offense, 2) mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense, and 3) not legally insane at the time of the offense." 99 The
court concluded that due process is satisfied if, prior to sentencing, the court receives a report regarding the GBMI defendant's
present mental state.100
In Indiana, the allegedly "broad and vague" definitions of
"mental illness" and "insanity" also have been challenged on due
process grounds. In Taylor v. State,' 0 ' the defendant based his
equal protection and due process arguments on this perceived
definitional difficulty. 10 2 As previously discussed, the Supreme
03
Court of Indiana rejected these arguments.
The Illinois Appellate Court also has rejected a defendant's
definitional argument, which was couched in terms ofjury confusion. In People v. De Wit,' 0 4 a defendant previously found GBMI of
murder contended that, because of the definitional overlap be98. 407 Mich. at 659, 288 N.W2d at 917.
99. Id. The court defined the limited right to liberty of GBMI convicts as
follows: "They no longer have a right to unfettered liberty. They have been
convicted of a crime. Their only interest is in obtaining a term of probation
similar to other persons convicted of the same crime." Id.
100. Id. at 660, 288 N.W.2d at 918.
101. - Ind. -, 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982). Accord People v. Sharif, 87 Mich.
App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978). For a further discussion of Sharif, see supra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
102. For a further discussion of the defendant's arguments and the court's
treatment of them, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
103. -. Ind. at - ,440 N.E.2d at 1111.
104. 123 1I. App. 3d 723, 463 N.E.2d 742 (1984). For other courts' treatment of jury confusion, see infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
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tween "mental illness" and "insanity," the statutes failed to provide adequate standards to enable the jury to arrive at a fair
verdict. He asserted that this deficiency promoted jury confusion,
encouraged a GBMI verdict as a compromise, and thus rendered
the GBMI provision unconstitutional on its face, 10 5 depriving him
of due process. The state argued that, since the insanity defense
came into existence, juries have been making implicit findings of
whether a defendant is insane or is suffering from less severe
mental illness. The GBMI provision, said the state, merely made
the finding explicit. 10 6 The state also asserted that the provision
actually reduced jury confusion by clarifying the legal meaning of
"insanity," which had acquired a less precise meaning in common
usage. 10 7 The court found the state's arguments persuasive. It
held that the GBMI provision expressed its requirements in simple and clear language and that it provided sufficiently definite
standards. 10 8 The court added that the possibility of a compromise verdict was not a constitutional infirmity under these
circumstances. 0 9
In People v. Kaeding,1 10 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
with little discussion the defendant's argument that the court
should strictly scrutinize the disputed GBMI statute because the
statute implicated "the fundamental right to fair treatment in
criminal proceedings guaranteed by due process." ' i The court
held that due process did not encompass a right to supervision of
incarcerated GBMI offenders by the sentencing court rather than
by the Department of Corrections. 1 2 Even though the defendant
did not argue that GBMI inmates were a suspect class, the court
stated that such an argument would lack merit.' 13 In the absence
of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the court upheld
the Illinois GBMI statute as rationally related to a legitimate state
105. 123 11.App. 3d at 735, 463 N.E.2d at 750.

106. Id.
107. Id. The state noted that the comparison between the requirements of
NGRI and GBMI verdicts clarified the meaning of insanity and thereby helped
the jury in reaching a decision. Id.
108. Id. at 736, 463 N.E.2d at 750.
109. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the jury must
still make a determination regarding "whether a defendant is guilty or legally
insane based upon the evidence at trial." Id.
2d 237, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983). For a further discussion of Kae110. 98 I11.
ding, see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
111. 98 11.2d at 244-46, 456 N.E.2d at 15-17.
112. Id. at 246, 456 N.E.2d at 17.
113. Id.
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interest. 114
3.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

An eighth amendment challenge alleging cruel and unusual
punishment has been made against a GBMI statute on only two
occasions. One such challenge arose in a Michigan trial court in
People v. McLeod. 115 After conducting hearings regarding the
types and availability of mental health treatment necessary for the
defendant, the recorder's court set aside a GBMI verdict, declaring the verdict form a nullity. 1 6 Because neither the Department
of Corrections nor the Department of Mental Health would provide the treatment that the defendant needed, the court found
that compliance with the statute was impossible. 1 7 It reasoned
that if the stated purpose of the GBMI statute was treatment of
mentally ill criminals, failure to treat amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 1 18 The
Michigan Supreme Court avoided this issue by finding that the
evidence in the trial record was insufficient to sustain the challenge to the statute. 1 19 When the cruel and unusual punishment
challenge was raised a second time, in Indiana, the Indiana Court
of Appeals summarily dismissed it, saying that the proper remedy
was a writ of mandamus or a civil rights action under section
1983,120 not a direct appeal.' 2 1 Thus, the question remains
22
unresolved.1
114. Id. at 247, 456 N.E.2d at 17. For a further discussion of the court's
application of the rational relation test in Kaeding, see supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
115. See McLeod, 407 Mich. at 648-49, 288 N.W.2d at 912. For a further
discussion of McLeod, see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
116. 407 Mich. at 649, 288 N.W.2d at 913.
117. Id. In addition to the finding that these departments would not provide the necessary treatment for the defendant, the recorder's court noted that
"conditions within the Department of Corrections, as described by the Department's psychiatrist, posed an immediate threat of irreparable harm to defendant." Id. at 648-49, 288 N.W.2d at 912-13.
118. Id. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915. See also D.H.J. HERMANN, supra note 2,
at 96-99.
119. 407 Mich. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915. The court reasoned that it was
impossible for a trial court fairly to determine prior to commitment whether the
Department of Corrections would comply with the statute after commitment. Id.
at 654-55, 288 N.W.2d at 915.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For the text of § 1983, see infra note 215.
121. Stader v. State, - Ind. App. -. -, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (1983).
122. Another possible eighth amendment challenge is pending in Indiana.
An Indiana trial court recently sentenced a defendant found GBMI of murder to
die in the electric chair. Harris, HarrisGiven Death Penalty in Precedent-Setting Case,
Indianapolis News, Feb. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1. This case raises the question of
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Ex Post Facto Laws

In Georgia and Illinois, the retroactive application of newly
enacted GBMI statutes to defendants who committed crimes
prior to their enactment has precipitated challenges based on the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.1 23 In Kirkland
v. State, 12 4 the defendant claimed that retroactive application of
the Georgia GBMI statute unconstitutionally deprived her of an
NGRI verdict. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the verdict,
reasoning that it did not increase her punishment but, rather, had
an ameliorative effect.' 25 The court stated that a GBMI verdict
"decidedly lessens the stigma of criminal guilt and provides for
the treatment of [the defendant's] mental illness."' 126 It added
that "[w]here the verdict is authorized by the evidence, the application of the 'guilty but mentally ill' act is procedural, not substantive; it leaves untouched the substantive right to the insanity
plea as an absolute defense."' 12 7 The court concluded that the
GBMI verdict was not an ex post facto law.
In People v. Marshall,12 8 the Illinois Appellate Court used a
similar rationale in upholding application of the GBMI statute
even though the defendant's crime took place seven months
before the statute's enactment.129 The court stated that the application of the GBMI statute in this case did not increase the defendant's punishment, but merely altered the conditions of
whether mental illness, adjudged as part of the GBMI conviction, should mitigate against the death penalty. Of the twelve states having GBMI statutes, all
but Alaska and Michigan permit the death sentence. All these GBMI statutes
permit the sentencing court to impose any sentence that could be imposed on a
guilty defendant. See Table 3.
123. An ex post facto law is a law passed after the occurrence of a fact or
deed, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences of the fact or deed.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 529 (5th ed. 1979). For example, a law that increases
the punishment for a prior act is an ex postfacto law. The United States Constitution, as well as the state constitutions of Georgia and Illinois, expressly prohibit
the passing of ex postfacto laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1, para. 10; ILL. CONST. art. I,

§ 16.

124. 166 Ga. App. 478, 482, 304 S.E.2d 561, 565 (1983).
125. Id. at 482, 304 S.E.2d at 565. The court noted that being found guilty
but mentally ill "reduces or modifies the penalty of a guilty verdict." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The court thus added defendant's continuing right to the insanity
plea to its lengthy list of benefits conferred on a defendant by the retroactive
application of the GBMI statute, noting that, "[i]f the verdict of guilty is authorized by the evidence, the accused is given an additional advantage when the
guilty but mentally ill statute is applied." Id.
128. 114 Ill. App. 3d 217, 448 N.E.2d 969 (1983).
129. Id. at 234-35; 448 N.E.2d at 980-81.
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130
confinement by ensuring adequate mental health treatment.
The court reasoned that "[s]tatutes which change the conditions
under which punishment for an offense is imposed, but which do
not significantly alter the fundamental nature of the punishment,
13 1
are not ex post facto laws."'
The court in Marshallfaced another ex postfacto law argument.
The defendant asserted that the GBMI statute had the possible
effect of making criminal an action that previously was innocent
by depriving her of available defenses. 132 Specifically, if she had
known that asserting the insanity defense opened the door to a
possible GBMI verdict, she might have used a self-defense or
lack-of-specific-intent defense instead. 133 The court rebuffed this
argument, stating that a statute that does not "completely" deprive a defendant of an available defense is not an ex post facto
law. 134

C.

Substantive and Procedural Provisions

1. Pleading Procedures
Both the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan Court
of Appeals have rendered decisions construing the statutory provision for acceptance of a GBMI plea.' 3 5 In People v. Booth, 136 two
130. Id. The Illinois statute regarding the sentencing and treatment of defendants found GBMI provides in pertinent part:
(b) If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant
who has been found guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be committed to the Department of Corrections, which shall cause periodic
inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent,
continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological,
or other counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines
necessary.
(c) The Department of Corrections may transfer the defendant's custody to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-8-5 of this Act.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
131. 114 Ill. App. 3d at 234, 448 N.E.2d at 981 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 235, 448 N.E.2d at 981.
133. Id. A defendant may be found GBMI in Illinois only if he or she has
asserted the insanity defense at trial. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(c) (SmithHurd Supp. 1983-1984).
134. 114 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 448 N.E.2d at 981. The court noted that
although it is well settled that a statute that "completely" deprives the defendant
of a defense that was available at the time of the offense is an ex postfacto law, no
cases hold that a statute that "merely makes the assertion of certain defenses less
desirable than they would have been at the time of an offense" constitutes an ex
postfacto law. Id.
135. See People v. Booth, 414 Mich. 343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982); People v.
Williams, 129 Mich. App. 648, 341 N.W.2d 854 (1983) (per curiam); People v.
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defendants pleaded GBMI to charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. At trial, the defendants were unable to recall some
of the events surrounding the perpetration of the crime. The trial
judge therefore referred to the preliminary examination transcript in concluding that a sufficient factual basis for acceptance of
the pleas existed.' 3 7 On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court,
the issue was
whether a defendant who is unable to recall some or all
of the events surrounding the commission of a particular
crime may enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to that
crime, and, if so, what procedure is to be utilized at the
plea-taking proceeding to establish a factual basis for the
38
plea.1
The court concluded that a forgetful defendant could plead
GBMI and that a trial court could consider a transcript of the preliminary examination or trial testimony, if any, but that in all
other respects a court should follow the procedures applicable to
guilty pleas. 13 9 The court reasoned that to deny forgetful defendants the opportunity to plead GBMI and, thereby, to receive the
mental health treatment due them would undercut the legislative
intent behind the GBMI statutes.' 40 The court upheld both de41
fendants' convictions. 1
Siebers, 129 Mich. App. 465, 341 N.W.2d 530 (1983); People v. Bazzi, 113 Mich.
App. 606, 318 N.W.2d 484 (1981) (per curiam); People v. Fultz, Ill Mich. App.
587, 314 N.W.2d 702 (1981); People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 290 N.W.2d
123 (1980); People v. Long, 86 Mich. App. 676, 273 N.W.2d 519 (1979), rev'd
sub nom. People v. Booth, 414 Mich. 343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982).
136. 414 Mich. 343, 350, 324 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1982).
137. Id. at 351, 324 N.W.2d at 744. Each defendant separately acknowledged on the record his belief that, based on the facts available to him, he was in
fact guilty of the crime for which his plea was being offered. Id.
138. Id. at 348, 324 N.W.2d at 743.
139. Id. at 348-49, 324 N.W.2d at 743. The court apparently was addressing only procedures applicable to the "guilty" aspect of a "guilty but mentally
ill" plea-taking proceeding. Although the court failed to address how the determination of mental illness fits into the procedures for accepting a guilty plea, it
stated that the GBMI statutory language "suggests that ... questions of mental
illness must be determined in addition to the usual questions of criminal liability .... ." Id. at 356, 324 N.W.2d at 746. It also cited § 768.36(2) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, which requires the judge to examine psychiatric reports,
hold a hearing on the mental illness issue, and be satisfied that the defendant
was mentally ill at the time of the offense. Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 768.36(2) (West 1982)).
140. Id. at 354, 324 N.W.2d at 745-46.
141. Id. at 364, 324 N.W.2d at 750. The court said that the standard of
review to be applied by an appellate court in reviewing the adequacy of a plea's
factual basis is " 'whether the trier of fact could properly convict on the facts'
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In People v. Bazzi, 14 2 the Michigan Court of Appeals also considered whether a forgetful defendant could plead GBMI. The
court stated that external evidence could be used to establish the
factual basis for certain elements of an offense 143 and proceeded
to outline the required plea-taking procedure. The court must
(1) directly question the defendant to determine if he or she is
guilty of the offense, (2) examine psychiatric reports, 14 4 and
(3) hold a hearing to determine if the defendant was mentally ill
at the time of the offense.1 45 This result is consistent with Booth,
which was decided after Bazzi.
Arguably, however, Booth only addressed the factual basis for
the "guilt" determination in a GBMI plea-taking procedure. 146 In
Bazzi and People v. Fultz, 14 7 the court of appeals directly addressed
the "mental illness" determination. The defendant in Bazzi challenged the factual basis of the mental illness finding, arguing that
while two independent examiners concluded that he was insane at
the time of the crime, the Center for Forensic Psychiatry concluded that he was neither mentally ill nor insane. 4s The court
rejected this challenge, stating that although none of the examiners concluded that the defendant was mentally ill but not insane,
psychiatric evaluations admitted as evidence serve only as an aid
elicited from defendant at the plea-taking proceeding, or from alternate reliable
sources." Id. at 360, 324 N.W.2d at 748 (quoting People v. Haack, 396 Mich.
367, 376-77, 240 N.W.2d 704, 709 (1976)).
142. 113 Mich. App. 606, 608, 318 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1981) (per curiam).
143. Id. The basic elements of the offense were established through the testimony of the defendant who, in response to direct questioning by the court,
testified that he shot his wife with a .38-caliber gun that he had purchased on the
street, and that he knew it was wrong to kill someone. The defendant did not
know, however, whether his wife had died as a result of the gunshot wounds.
The court then introduced external evidence in the form of autopsy reports to
determine the cause of death. Id.
144. Accord People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 199, 290 N.W.2d 123,
124-25 (1980). But see People v. Williams, 129 Mich. App. 648, 649, 341 N.W.2d
854, 855 (1983) (court need not examine reports if defendant fails to assert insanity defense).
145. 113 Mich. App. at 608-09, 318 N.W.2d at 485.
146. For a discussion of Booth, see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying
text.
147. 111 Mich. App. 587, 314 N.W.2d 702 (1981).
148. 113 Mich. App. at 609, 318 N.W.2d at 485-86. The Center for Forensic Psychiatry and the independent examiners disagreed only regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. The Center concluded that
"while defendant had experienced several medical and personal problems resulting in severe depressive reaction which required several terms of hospitalization in a mental institution, he was neither mentally ill nor insane at the time the
offense was committed." Id., 318 N.W.2d at 485.
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to the court. 149 The substance of the psychiatric reports and the
150
defendant's testimony supported the trial court's decision.
In People v. Fultz, however, the court did find the factual basis
for a mental illness finding to be insufficient.' 5' Erroneously citing section 768.36(1) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 152 the
court stated that, before accepting a GBMI plea, the trier of fact
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty,
153
was mentally ill at the time of the crime, and was not insane.
The only evidence in the record of the defendant's mental state
was the forensic report that said he was insane. 154 The court held
that a finding of no insanity was essential to a GBMI plea and that
15 5
such a finding was not supported by the record.
2.

Burden of Proof

Two decisions have addressed the prosecution's burden to
prove a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt before a
GBMI finding may be entered following a trial on the merits. A
jury found the defendant in People v. Murphy1 56 GBMI of breaking

and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit a felony
and of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Michigan Court
of Appeals stated that the prosecution improperly had introduced
evidence regarding the defendant's sanity because a defendant is
presumed sane until he introduces contrary evidence and because
the prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation for introduction
of the evidence. 157 Without this inadmissible evidence-testimony by the arresting police officers that they had observed no
abnormal behavior during the arrest-the record was devoid of
149. Id. at 609, 318 N.W.2d at 486.
150. Id. For a summary of defendant's testimony, see supra note 143.

151. 111 Mich. App. at 591, 314 N.W.2d at 704.
152. The court was incorrect in citing § 768.36(1) because the prerequisites
listed in that subsection apply only to a GBMI finding following a trial on the
merits. The court should have cited subsection (2), which applies to GBMI pleas
and does not require an affirmative finding that the defendant is not insane. The
prosecution correctly argued that no finding of sanity is required for a court to
accept a GBMI plea. Id. at 590, 314 N.W.2d at 704.
153. Id. at 590, 314 N.W.2d at 703.
154. Id. at 591, 314 N.W.2d at 704.
155. Id. Contra People v. Williams, 129 Mich. App. 648, 649, 341 N.W.2d
854, 855 (1983) (no specific finding of insanity required if defendant does not
raise the issue).
156. 100 Mich. App. 413, 415, 299 N.W.2d 51, 52 (1980), ajfd, 416 Mich.
453, 331 N.W.2d 152 (1982).
157. Id. The court held that this evidence was admitted "without a proper
foundation" because of the police officers' "lack of ample opportunity to observe the accused." Id.
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evidence that the defendant was sane.' 5 8 Expert testimony subsequently introduced by both the prosecution and the defense
strongly supported an insanity finding.1 59 Thus, the court held
that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 160 The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.' 6' The court stated that even if the prosecution's
evidence of sanity were admissible, its probative value was insufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant was
sane.' 62 The court said that, to some extent, the evidence necessary to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt is determined by
the strength of the case for insanity.' 63 Because of the strong
showing of insanity, the police officers' testimony was insufficient.
In People v. Gore, 16 4 the defendant appealed from the trial
judge's finding that he was GBMI of attempted indecent liberties
with a child. The defendant asserted that the state failed to rebut
his insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 5 The Illinois
Court of Appeals concluded that although an expert witness believed a valid insanity defense existed, the trial court was not required to accept this conclusion. 166 The court stated that the trial
court's finding of sanity was "not so improbable or unsatisfactory
'
as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity. "167
158. Id.
159. Id. The court noted that there was "no evidence on this record that
[the defendant] was sane, since the expert witnesses of both the prosecution and
the defense testified that he was in fact insane." Id.
160. Id. at 416, 299 N.W.2d at 53. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 768.36(1)(c) (West 1982).
161. 416 Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152 (1982).
162. Id. at 456, 331 N.W.2d at 153-54. The court explained that "[t]he
relevant question is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 456, 331 N.W.2d
at 154.
163. Id. at 464, 331 N.W.2d at 157. See also supra text accompanying note
158. A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed sane. Once he introduces any evidence of insanity, however, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to establish his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. It follows that "merely some
evidence of sanity may be sufficient to meet some evidence of insanity and yet
wholly insufficient to meet substantial evidence of insanity." Id.
164. 116 I1. App. 3d 780, 781, 452 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1983).
165. Id. at 786, 452 N.E.2d at 588.
166. Id. The trial court's decision not to accept the statement of the expert
witness was not without reason. The expert made the statement in a letter to the
assistant state's attorney more than five months after examining the defendant
for competency to stand trial. Moreover, the expert indicated that he would
want to examine the defendant again if he were to testify on the question of
insanity. Id.
167. Id.
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3. Jury Instructions
Case law on GBMI jury instructions has focused on the following three issues: (1) whether instructions on the GBMI verdict
are mandatory or permissible; (2) whether GBMI instructions
confuse a jury and lead to a compromise verdict; and (3) whether
the verdict's dispositional consequences may be included in the
instructions. Courts in Michigan, New Mexico, Illinois, and Indiana have all addressed at least one of these issues.
In People v. Girard,16 8 the Michigan Court of Appeals observed
that whenever a defendant asserts an insanity defense, the trial
court at the conclusion of trial must instruct "(1) that the jury is to
consider separately the issues of the presence or absence of
mental illness and the presence or absence of legal insanity, and
(2) on the possible verdicts of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, not
guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty."' 6 9 In People v. Ritsema, 170 the trial court granted the defendant's request that the

GBMI instruction be omitted. The Michigan Court of Appeals
held that whenever the evidence supports an instruction on the
insanity defense the relevant statute made the GBMI instruction
7
mandatory and thus not subject to waiver by the defendant.' '
The court said, however, that retrial was unnecessary to remedy
the trial court's error. 17 2 It reasoned that the only prejudice suffered by the guilty defendant was in not being entitled to the
mental health evaluation and treatment required after a GBMI
verdict.' 7 3 To eliminate this prejudice the court amended the defendant's sentence to require psychiatric evaluation and indicated
treatment.

174

168. 96 Mich. App. 594, 293 N.W.2d 639 (1980).
169. Id. at 596-97, 293 N.W.2d at 641 (citing MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 768.29a(2) (West 1982)). See also People v. Mikulin, 84 Mich. App. 705, 709,
270 N.W.2d 500, 501-02 (1978) (GBMI instruction required whenever an NGRI
instruction is warranted by the evidence).
170. 105 Mich. App. 602, 307 N.W.2d 380 (1981).
171. Id. at 612, 307 N.W.2d at 385. Accord People v. Thomas, 96 Mich.
App. 210, 221, 292 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1980).
172. 105 Mich. App. at 612, 307 N.W.2d at 385. The court believed retrial
was unnecessary because the defendant had been tried and found guilty of the
offense charged. The jury had not believed that he was insane. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 613, 307 N.W.2d at 385. In a later decision, the Michigan Court
of Appeals criticized its own decision in Ritsema that the trial court's error did
not require reversal. See People v. Gasco, 119 Mich. App. 143, 326 N.W.2d 397
(1982) (per curiam). With minimal discussion, the court said in Gasco that the
Ritsema decision was "unsound." Id. at 146-47, 326 N.W.2d at 399. In Gasco, the
court reversed a guilty finding, stating that the trial court's erroneous instruction
on the definition of "sanity" left the jury with discretion to find the defendant
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The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has addressed the narrow issue of whether a GBMI instruction may be given in the absence of an NGRI instruction. 75 The relevant statute provides
that when a defendant has asserted an insanity defense, the court
should instruct the jury regarding the GBMI verdict if such an
instruction is warranted by the evidence. 76 The court interpreted this provision as not precluding such an instruction if,
although the defendant did not plead insanity, he did request an
instruction regarding his inability to form the requisite mens rea to
17 7
commit a criminal offense.
The issue of juror confusion has been addressed in three
Michigan cases 178 and one Illinois case. 179 People v. Thomas' s0 is
illustrative. The defendant in this case argued that the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury on the GBMI verdict because the
instruction "unconstitutionally confuses the jury in its resolution
of the issue of criminal responsibility and encourages a compromise verdict."'' s The court of appeals noted that the instruction
was required by statute and that the trial court complied with the
statute by giving the standard criminal jury instructions, which offered sufficient guidance to the jury. 8 2 The court found no evieither guilty or GBMI. Id. at 146, 326 N.W.2d at 399. The court concluded:
"Thus, the verdict of guilty [did] not preclude the possibility that the jury
thought defendant was mentally ill." Id. at 146, 326 N.W.2d at 399. The Gasco
opinion leaves unclear what it was in the instruction that resulted in the jury's
discretion or why the Ritserma remedy was unsound.
175. See State v. Page, 100 N.M. 788, 676 P.2d 1353 (1984).
176. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3E (1984). The relevant portion of the statute
provides as follows:
When a defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court,
where warranted by the evidence, shall provide the jury with a special
verdict form of guilty but mentally ill and shall separately instruct the
jury that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be returned instead of a
verdict of guilty or not guilty, and that such a verdict requires a finding
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the offense charged and that the defendant was not legally insane at the
time of the commission of the offense but that he was mentally ill at that
time.
Id.
177. 100 N.M. at -, 676 P.2d at 1356.
178. See People v. Delaughter, 124 Mich. App. 356, 335 N.W.2d 37 (1983);
People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 292 N.W.2d 523 (1980); People v. Sorna,
88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
179. See People v. De Wit, 123 Ill. App. 3d 723, 463 N.E.2d 742 (1984). For
a discussion of De Wit, see supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
180. 96 Mich. App. 210, 292 N.W.2d 523 (1980).
181. Id. at 220, 292 N.W.2d at 527.
182. Id. at 221, 292 N.W.2d at 527. The Michigan GBMI statute is clear
with respect to jury instructions:
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dence that the jury was misled.' 8 3
Whether a court may instruct a jury regarding the consequences of a GBMI verdict was addressed in Indiana in Stader v.
State.' 84 The defendant alleged that the trial court erred by refusing jury instructions on the consequences of a GBMI or NGRI
verdict. 18 5 The court of appeals held that no error had occurred. 18 6 As a general rule, "it is erroneous to inform the jury of
the possible penalties which may be imposed upon conviction." 187 A trial court has discretion, however, to instruct a jury
on the consequences of a verdict if it deems it necessary. 18 8 Such
an instruction is mandatory if "an erroneous view of the applicable laws becomes implanted in the minds ofjurors."' 8 9 In applying these rules, the court stated that the jury had not been
presented with an erroneous statement of the law and that it was
within the trial court's discretion to refuse the instruction.' 9 0
In People v. Tenbrink, 19 ' a Michigan trial court sua sponte instructed the jury regarding the possible dispositions after GBMI
and NGRI verdicts.' 92 Because the defendant failed to make a
timely objection to the instruction, the Michigan Court of Appeals
said it would only reverse to prevent manifest injustice. 193 Under
these circumstances, the court said the instruction was proper,
adopting the rationale of Lyles v. United States.' 94 In Lyles, the
If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with
section 20a, the defendant may be found "guilty but mentally ill" if,
after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable
doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the
commission of that offense.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 768.36(1) (1975).
183. 96 Mich. App. at 221, 292 N.W.2d at 527.
184. - Ind. App. -., 453 N.E.2d 1032 (1983).
185. Id. at -, 453 N.E.2d at 1035-36.
186. Id. at -, 453 N.E.2d at 1036.
187. Id. (citing State v. Williams, - Ind. -, 430 N.E.2d 756 (1982)).
188. Id. (citing Montague v. State, 266 Ind. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181 (1977);
Lockridge v. State, 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d 275 (1975)).
189. Id. (citing Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405 (1972)).
190. Id.
191. 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223 (1979).
192. Id. at 328, 287 N.W.2d at 224.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 330-31, 287 N.W.2d at 224-25 (citing Lyles v. United States, 254
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
943 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
distinguished guilty verdict instructions, which could not include
dispositional information, from NGRI instructions, which
could. 19 5 The court in Lyles had reasoned:
Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of
the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is
common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means
the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means
that he is subject to such punishment as the court may
impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
has no such commonly understood meaning. . . . We
think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this
possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common
knowledge the meaning of the other two possible
96
verdicts. '
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded in Tenbrink that this
rationale applied equally to NGRI and GBMI dispositional instructions and that, absent timely objection by defense counsel,
the instructions were proper. 9 7 The court did not suggest
whether its decision would have been different had defense counsel objected to the instructions.
4.

Inconsistent Verdicts

Another issue the Michigan Court of Appeals has addressed
is the appropriate remedy for situations in which a jury reaches
two legally inconsistent verdicts. In People v. Philpot,19 8 the jury
found the defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder and
GBMI of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony.' 9 9
The court held that the inconsistency should be remedied by adding the "but mentally ill" language to the assault conviction with
leave to the prosecution to seek a new trial on the assault
charge.200 It reasoned that a legislative purpose of the GBMI
195. Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728-29, quoted in Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. at 328, 287
N.W.2d at 224.
196. Id. at 728.
197. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. at 330-31, 287 N.W.2d at 224-25.
198. 98 Mich. App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980).
199. Id. at 261, 296 N.W.2d at 230-31.
200. Id. at 260, 296 N.W.2d at 230. The majority responded in a footnote
to an argument set forth in the dissenting opinion that such a remedy usurped
the power of the jury:
We disagree with Judge Riley's position that this holding amounts
to a substitution of our judgment of what is best for the defendant for
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statute was to provide help to defendants who have committed
crimes while suffering from mental illness, and that the present
defendant could benefit from treatment beyond the relatively
short sentence imposed for the firearm conviction. 20 ' Judge Riley
dissented on this point, stating that the "fact that the evaluation
and treatment triggered by such a finding would be beneficial to
the accused is irrelevant. We should not substitute our judgment
of what is 'best' for the defendant for that of the jury." 20 2 Normally, he stated he would advocate vacating of the firearm conviction, but because the relevant sentence was nearly expired, such
action was unnecessary. 20 3 More recently, in People v. Blue, 20 4 the
court followed the Philpot majority opinion, but chose not to correct the inconsistent verdicts because the resulting sentences
were coextensive and treatment would be provided throughout
20 5
their term.
Thus, inconsistent guilty and GBMI verdicts have not troubled the courts. The courts have not yet decided, however,
whether inconsistent NGRI and GBMI verdicts would be so easily
handled. An Alaska statute provides that if a defendant is found
NGRI because reasonable doubt exists regarding the requisite
mens rea, yet all other elements of the offense are satisfied, the
defendant automatically should be found GBMI of any lesser included offense of which he or she is convicted. 20 6 This provision,
however, does not govern if NGRI and GBMI verdicts are rethe judgment of thejury. Thejury found defendant guilty but mentally
ill on one charge but unexplicably omitted the finding of mental illness
on the other. Faced with such an inconsistency, we must side with one
or the other of the jury's apparent findings, and we believe that sound
policy dictates siding with the finding of mental illness. Accordingly,
rather than substituting our judgment for that of the jury, we are
merely giving the judgment of the jury its proper scope.
Id. at 261 n.2, 296 N.W.2d at 231 n.2.
201. Id. at 261, 296 N.W.2d at 230-31.
202. Id. at 264, 296 N.W.2d at 232 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a summary of the majority's response to this argument, see
supra note 200.
203. 98 Mich. App. at 265, 296 N.W.2d at 232 (Riley, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
204. 114 Mich. App. 137, 318 N.W.2d 498 (1982).
205. Id. at 142, 318 N.W.2d at 499-500. Blue, however, can be distinguished from Philpot. In Blue, the two verdicts resulted from two separate trials,
leading the court to conclude that the inconsistency was "of no significance." Id.
at 142, 318 N.W.2d at 500.
206. ALsKA STAT. § 12.47.020(c) (1984). Upon completion of the sentence for the lesser included offense, a hearing is held to determine if, based on
the acquittal for the greater offense, further commitment is necessary. Id.
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No other states have a similar

Right to Treatment

Although allegations based upon lack of adequate treatment
have been rejected as a basis for constitutional attack on GBMI
statutes, 20 7 several courts have recognized a qualified statutory
right to treatment. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan
has recognized an "unequivocal statutory right" to such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for mental illness or retardation. 20 8 Specifically, the GBMI statute requires treatment, but
only when indicated by mental health screening and evaluation
performed by correctional officials. 20 9 No court, however, has yet
overturned a GBMI conviction of, or provided postconviction relief to, a defendant asserting that he or she has received no treatment. In People v. Tenbrink,2 10 the defendant contended that if the
Department of Corrections is unable to provide the required psychiatric care in a particular case, the conviction is rendered invalid
and must be reversed. The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed. 21 1 The court stated that the proper remedy was a writ of
mandamus to enforce the Department of Corrections' duty, not a
21 2
reversal of the conviction.
In Stader v. State, 213 the Indiana Court of Appeals similarly
found that lack of treatment was relevant not to "the legality of
214
. . .incarceration, but merely the conditions of. . .detention."
207. See Marshall, 114 Il1. App. 3d at 233, 448 N.E.2d at 980 (GBMI inmates
have no separate constitutional right to mental health treatment beyond the constitutional right to minimally adequate medical care applicable to all prisoners);
McLeod, 407 Mich. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915 ("Department of Corrections'
noncompliance with the statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment cannot
render an otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional.").
208. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 914. See also Philpot, 98 Mich.
App. at 261, 296 N.W.2d at 230.
209. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 914. See also Kaeding, 98 Ill.
2d at 243-44, 456 N.E.2d at 15-16; Marshall, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 232-33, 448
N.E.2d at 979-80. Cf Sharif, 87 Mich. App. at 199, 274 N.W.2d at 19 (trial court
disclaimed its own authority to assure that Department of Corrections would
evaluate and treat defendants and stated it could only recommend such
treatment).
210. 98 Mich. App. at 331, 287 N.W.2d at 225.
211. Id.
212. Id. Accord People v. Siebers, 129 Mich. App. 465, 469, 341 N.W.2d
530, 532 (1983); People v. Toner, 125 Mich. App. 439, 441, 336 N.W.2d 22, 2324 (1983); People v. Willsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 355, 292 N.W.2d 145, 147
(1980); People v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
213. - Ind. App. -, 453 N.E.2d 1032 (1983).
214. Id. at -, 453 N.E.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original).
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Accordingly, this issue could not properly be raised on direct appeal. The court went slightly beyond the Michigan Court of Appeals' finding in Tenbrink, however, by stating that an inmate may
challenge the conditions of custody by not only a petition for writ
of mandamus, but also a civil rights action under section 1983.215
Taken together, these decisions suggest the limited nature of the
statutory right to treatment afforded to GBMI offenders.
A potentially significant challenge to the application of the
right to receive "such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated" is
currently pending in Michigan. In Gorton v. Johnson, 2 16 the plaintiffs alleged
that all persons who have been convicted under the
GBMI statute have not been provided treatment that is
"psychiatrically indicated," because the Department of
Corrections lacks the resources to provide any psychiatric treatment whatsoever to any prisoners other than
those who present the most extreme disciplinary
21 7
problems.
The plaintiffs in Gorton are GBMI inmates who sought class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 2 18 The
defendants, the Department of Corrections and its director,
215. Id. See also Pruitt v. Joiner, 182 Ind. App. 218, 222, 395 N.E.2d 276,

278-79 (1979).
Section 1983 of title 42 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Thus, under Stader, an inmate may bring an action
under § 1983 against prison officials to challenge the conditions of his or her
prison life. Cf Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (the sole federal remedy when prisoner challenges fact or duration of imprisonment is writ of habeas
corpus).
216. 100 F.R.D. 801 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
217. Id. at 801-02.
218. Id. at 802. The court found preliminarily that the plaintiffs had met
the requirements for class certification under rule 23(a). Id. Rule 23(a)
provides:
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The central controversy of the case centered on whether
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among others, argued that class certification was improper because each inmate presented unique treatment problems and because the court would be unable to fashion an equitable remedy
applicable to all members of the class. 21 9 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but only as to "those issues of
institutional policy, practice, process, and procedure that are
'generally applicable' to all members of the proposed class," and
not as to actual acts of evaluation and treatment that are a function of individual disorders. 22 0 Specifically, the court in Gorton
considered itself competent to
determine whether the Department of Corrections, as a
threshold matter, has instituted policies which render
the provision of psychiatrically indicated treatment impossible, regardless of the particular needs and
problems of the individual class members and whether
the defendants have policies, practices, processes, and
procedures to evaluate and provide psychiatrically indi22
cated treatment. '
Gorton is the first reported class action suit challenging any facet
of a GBMI statute's application.
6. Probation
In People v. McLeod,2 2 2 the defendant's final challenge to
Michigan's GBMI statute addressed the probation provision,
which provides in pertinent part: "The period of probation shall
not be for less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without
receipt and consideration of a forensic psychiatric report by the
the plaintiffs had met the requirements of rule 23(b)(2). 100 F.R.D. at 802-04.
Rule 23(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
219. 100 F.R.D. at 802.
220. Id. at 803.
221. Id.
222. 407 Mich. 432, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980). For a discussion of the equal
protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment challenges in McLeod, see supra notes 89-94, 98-100 & 115-19 and accompanying text.
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sentencing court. ' 22 3 The defendant argued that the five-year
minimum period of probation denied GBMI offenders equal protection by adversely affecting their fundamental liberty interests
vis-a-vis defendants found guilty of the same offenses, without a
compelling state interest for the differing treatment. 224 As discussed earlier, 22 5 the Michigan Supreme Court found no fundamental right or suspect classification that would require strict
scrutiny of the provision.2 26 The court noted that the statute authorized a sentencing court to discontinue the normal five-year
period of probation on the defendant's motion when the treatment is no longer needed, 2 27 thus creating a "rebuttable five-year
period" of probation.2 28 The court upheld the provision as rationally furthering the legislative objective of providing super22 9
vised mental health treatment for GBMI probationers.
D.

Conclusion

The various challenges waged against GBMI statutes since
1977-substantive, procedural, and constitutional-have resulted
in the judiciary approving and preserving the legislative purposes
of providing treatment to mentally disturbed offenders and of
protecting the public from mentally disturbed and dangerous offenders. During this testing period, the courts have had little
negative to say about the GBMI legislation. In concluding that
the statutes rationally further proper legislative objectives, the
courts have not looked beyond the verdict to see if GBMI offenders actually received beneficial mental health treatment. In the
near future, such concerns may be addressed in writ of mandamus
or civil rights proceedings arising in the various states. Empirical
research may provide another forum for more comprehensive
analysis of such concerns.
IV.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbi223. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36(4) (West 1982).
224. 407 Mich. at 656-57, 288 N.W.2d at 916.
225. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
226. 407 Mich. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919.
227. Id. at 661, 288 N.W.2d at 918 (citing MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 768.36(4) (1982)).
228. Id. at 664, 288 N.W.2d at 919.
229. Id. For a discussion of the traditional indicia of what constitutes a suspect class, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973).
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trary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed is obviously not to be
determined by assumptions or by a priori reasoning. The
judgment should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible-Exfactojus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have a
23 0
system of living law.
The previous sections of this article summarized the legislative and judicial development of the GBMI plea and verdict. Legislative and judicial mandates for legal and policy reform are
distinguishable from the impact on practice that results. 2 3' This
article would be incomplete without a look beyond legislative and
judicial directives to the practical consequences that follow. The
actual implementation of the GBMI plea and verdict and their effects on both individuals and components of the criminal justice
system have not been examined extensively. Legal reform, informed public policy, and practice should depend, at least in part,
on the results of scientific research.2 32 Whether the GBMI plea
and verdict have undercut the insanity defense, facilitated the
provision of mental health treatment to mentally disturbed offenders, offered juries an equitable alternative to NGRI and guilty
verdicts, and served the interest of societal protection remain to
be examined empirically. The purposes of this section are to examine the limited empirical research in this area and to place the
GBMI plea and verdict in an appropriate framework for scientific
inquiry.
A.

Curtailment of the Insanity Defense

The major purpose of the GBMI plea and verdict appears to
230. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
231. See Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1

MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 69 (1976); Lottman, Whatever Happened to Kenneth
Donaldson?, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 288 (1977). Another authority has

commented
that as important as reforms in legal policies (viz., the "law on the
books") certainly are, these accomplishments must not be confused
with the end result (viz., the "law in practice"). It is therefore essential
that a wide range of evaluative research efforts be undertaken to ascertain the outcomes stemming from various policy and programmatic
changes.
Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions: Major Developments and Research
Needs, 4 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 219, 255-56 (1981).
232. Shuman, Decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty, 67 JUDICATURE
326 (1984).
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be to curtail use of the insanity defense.2 3 3 To date, attempts to
appraise whether the GBMI plea and verdict have accomplished
this purpose have centered primarily on Michigan's nine-year experience. Ames Robey, a psychiatrist who was one of the original
drafters of Michigan's GBMI statutes, 23 4 stated three years after
passage of the new law that the "dire predictions by some lawyers
that the NGRI acquittal would fall into disuse have not been
borne out." 23 5 Although Robey provided only sketchy data to
support his conclusions, he stated that after the Michigan law
took effect the rate of NGRI acquittals did drop somewhat, 23 6 but
that the number of referrals for criminal responsibility evaluations at the Michigan Center for Forensic Psychiatry actually
jumped dramatically, 23 7 and that the percentage of defendants
23 8
found civilly commitable rose.
Other Michigan researchers suggest that the proportion of
defendants found NGRI following insanity pleas in Michigan remained relatively stable following the introduction of the GBMI
plea and verdict in 1975.239 Criss and Racine, researchers at the
Center for Forensic Psychiatry, found that between 1976 and
1979, the proportion of defendants who were examined for criminal responsibility at the Center and were subsequently acquitted
by reason of insanity ranged from 6.6% (N=49) in 1978 to 8.6%
(N=48) in 1977 (mean=8.1%). 2 40 Criss and Racine were unable
to collect reliable comparative data for the period before the law's
233. For a discussion of this purpose, see supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
234. Robey, supra note 6, at 374-75.
235. Id. at 380.
236. Id. at 379-80. Robey stated that he knew of 21 cases in which GBMI
pleas were offered and accepted "in lieu of almost certain NGRI verdicts." Id.
237. Id. at 380. Robey stated:
In 1974, before the law was passed, there were 49 evaluations for criminal responsibility performed at the Forensic Center. After the law took
effect, in the remaining five months of 1975, there were 93 such referrals. By June 1, 1978, after the law had been extant for less than three
years, a similar five month period had 271 referrals, for an average of
over 50 per month.
Id.
238. Id.
239. See Criss & Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Standardfor Those Adjudicated
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 1975-1979, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
261, 265 (1980); Project, supra note 10, at 93; S.C. Bank, In Defense of GBMI,
Presentation at the Convention of the American Psychology-Law Society, Chicago (Oct. 6-8, 1983) (available at Villanova Law Review).
240. Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 264-65. Of the 2,389 individuals
evaluated by the Forensic Center between 1974 and 1979, 223 (8.1%) were subsequently found NGRI. Id. at 265.
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enactment. Based on more current data, Smith and Hall reported
a range of 5.0% (N=54) in 1981 to 8.4% (N=47) in 1977
(mean=6. 7 %) between 1976 and 1982.241 These findings suggest that the availability of the GBMI plea and verdict does not
necessarily result in fewer NGRI acquittals.
Two points might be considered in interpreting these findings. First, the conclusions of Smith and Hall and, to a lesser
extent, Criss and Racine, regarding the GBMI law's effect on the
incidence of NGRI acquittals were based upon proportional comparisons of arrest figures. Recognizing that comparisons of raw
numbers of GBMI findings and NGRI acquittals may be misleading, 2 42 Smith and Hall compared the number of defendants found
NGRI with the total number of arrests in Michigan. 243 From 1972
to 1982, the percentage of adult males arrested who were ultimately found NGRI ranged from 0.012% in 1976 to 0.035% in
1979.244 Similarly, Criss and Racine based some of their conclusions about the frequency of NGRI acquittals in Michigan on proportional comparisons of NGRI acquittals and arrests for index
offenses. 24 5 For example, they stated that only 0.11% of all individuals arrested in Michigan for index offenses raised the insanity
defense. 24 6 This comparison excludes at least 15.7% of the 223
NGRI acquittees in the study population, that is, those acquitted
24 7
of charges that were not index offenses.
Arrest figures may not be the most appropriate base for calculating such percentages in studies of the NGRI and GBMI verdict. Arrests may not result in prosecutions for a variety of
reasons. For example, the arresting agency may not file formal
charges or the prosecuting attorney may decide not to pursue the
case. Research on the use of the insanity defense and related alternatives should examine the outcome of court processing,
which is several steps removed from law enforcement activity.
Future research in this area might use criminal filings and dispositions as a more appropriate basis of comparison.
A second and perhaps more important consideration in eval241. Project, supra note 10, at 93, 107 (Appendix A, Table B).
242. Id. at 92 n.66.
243. Id. at 107 (Appendix A, Table A).
244. Id.
245. Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 264-66. Index offenses include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, breaking and entering, larceny, and auto
theft. Id. at 271 n.13.
246. Id. at 264.
247. See id. at 265 (Table 3-Criminal Charges of NGRI Population).
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uating the research concerning the effect of the GBMI laws on the
incidence of NGRI acquittals is that it is preliminary. Although
this formative research is valuable, further study of the effects of
the GBMI plea and verdict on NGRI acquittals requires a more
complex form of analysis. It is possible, for example, that an apparent decrease in the proportion of NGRI acquittals may be due
to events that occurred concomitant with the enactment of GBMI
legislation. The strength of a researcher's conclusions depends
on whether the researcher was aware of such rival phenomena
24 8
and was able to discount competing hypotheses.
For example, observers have noted a number of legislative
changes accompanying the introduction of the GBMI plea and
verdict in Michigan that have potential confounding effects.
These changes include new definitions of mental illness and insanity, a procedural timetable for defendants wishing to plead insanity, and new guidelines for short-term detention and release of
insanity acquittees. 249 Another authority noted that the 1975
Michigan statutory revisions also mandated that the Center for
Forensic Psychiatry act as the state's centralized facility for conducting forensic evaluations. 250 Future research should explore
the possibility that such collateral changes, occurring with the enactment of GBMI laws, have a discrete effect on the increase or
decrease in the proportion of defendants found NGRI or on the
types of individuals acquitted on the basis of insanity.
The confounding effect of events preceding the enactment of
GBMI laws also should be considered in analyzing research on
GBMI legislation and its effects. Once again, an example from
Michigan is instructive. After the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Dusky v. United States2 5' and subsequent lower court
248. See generally D.T. CAMPBELL &J.C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASIEXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1966).
249. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1400a, 2050 (West 1980),
§§ 768.21a(1), .20a (West 1982). See Note, GBMI, supra note 21, at 458 n.40,
47 1; R.C. Petrella, Guilty But Mentally Ill-A Negative View 2-3, Presentation at
the Convention of the American Psychology-Law Society, Chicago (Oct. 6-8,
1983) (available at Villanova Law Review).
250. I.K. Packer, Guilty But Mentally Ill in Michigan: Its History and Practice, Presentation at the Convention of the American Psychology-Law Society,
Chicago (Oct. 6-8, 1983) (available at Villanova Law Review); Petrella, supra note
249, at 2.
251. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). In Dusky, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that the record did not support finding defendant competent to stand trial. The test of such competency, stated the Court,
"must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402.
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decisions involving challenges to the extended commitment of
defendants found incompetent to stand trial, Michigan enacted
statutes that clarified the relevant NGRI criteria and revised the
NGRI release provisions. 2 52 As a result, hundreds of individuals
previously found incompetent to stand trial were returned to the
Michigan courts for disposition of their cases. According to Robey, these changes caused NGRI verdicts to increase from only 12
in 1967, to 203 by mid-1973.2 53 A study of the effects of the
GBMI plea and verdict on the insanity defense that includes comparisons of NGRI findings before and after GBMI enactment
should take this type of increase in the NGRI population into
account.
To understand the effects of definitional and procedural
changes on NGRI and GBMI findings, a comprehensive study design is essential. At minimum, the task of identifying competing
hypotheses should encompass a review of pertinent court rulings,
statutory changes, and organizational and administrative changes.
The methodology should be designed to measure systemic effects. Alternative explanations also should be addressed, in recognition of the fact that potentially confounding variables or
factors affecting generalizability will differ among states. For example, as noted previously, the effect of the GBMI plea and verdict on insanity acquittals in Michigan may be related significantly
to the centralized evaluation responsibilities of the Center for Fo254
rensic Psychiatry.
B.

Displacement

To further test the conclusion that the GBMI laws did not
undercut the insanity defense, a conclusion that was contrary to
2 55
the expectations of legislators who supported the GBMI laws,

Smith and Hall questioned whether defendants who were adjudicated GBMI would have been found NGRI or guilty had the
GBMI findings been available. 2 56 In the absence of the GBMI
252. Act ofJuly 1, 1966, No. 175, § 1, 1966 Mich. Pub. Acts 195 (repealed
1974); Act of July 12, 1966, No. 266, § 1, 1966 Mich. Pub. Acts 378 (repealed
1974). See Robey, supra note 6, at 374-75.
253. See Robey, supra note 6, at 374. Dr. Robey also stated that less than
half of these 203 commitments were "both medically and legally appropriate."
Id. at 374-75 (footnote omitted).
254. See Packer, supra note 250, at 2; Petrella, supra note 250, at 2; Project,
supra note 10, at 104.
255. For a discussion of the expectations of Michigan legislators who supported the bill, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
256. See Project, supra note 10, at 95-100. This question was also posed in a
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finding, all defendants would receive one of three traditional findings: guilty, not guilty, or NGRI. The addition of the GBMI finding necessarily displaces some defendants from one or more of
these categories. If the GBMI laws reduce the incidence of NGRI
acquittals, displacement of defendants from the NGRI category
would occur. On the other hand, if the GBMI finding has little or
no effect on NGRI findings, one instead would expect displacement from the guilty group.
Smith and Hall attempted to answer this displacement question by comparing samples of GBMI, NGRI, and guilty offenders
in Michigan on the basis of selected demographic variables. The
results of their discriminant analysis 2 57 indicated that the GBMI
group more closely resembled the guilty group on six variables
(drug use, previous psychiatric treatment, criminal history, sexual
offenses, employment status, and education) and the NGRI group
on two variables (age and prior referrals for forensic evaluation).2 5 8 Smith and Hall cautiously concluded that "the majority
of GBMI defendants were more similar to the guilty group than
the NGRI group. It is thus likely that at least a majority of the
GBMI defendants would have been found guilty in the,absence of
259
the GBMI statute."
Several technical questions can be raised about the methodology Smith and Hall used to reach this conclusion. First, Smith
and Hall measured only the type of drug use, not the extent and
duration of use. 260 Data on the type of drug use is more useful
than no information at all, yet grouping occasional users of hallucinogens, for example, with daily users of the drugs may result
in misleading comparisons. Occasional drug users may differ a
great deal from habitual users, psychologically and otherwise. It
thus remains to be seen whether GBMI offenders more closely
resemble NGRI acquittees or guilty offenders when the extent
and duration of drug use within the three groups are compared.
Second, Smith and Hall operationalized previous psychiatric
very recent study of simulated juror decisionmaking. For a discussion of this
study, see infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
257. "Discriminant analysis" is a statistical technique used to find the linear
combination of variables that best discriminates between or among two or more
groups of cases. See generally W. KLECKA, DiSCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 7-8 (1980).
258. Project, supra note 10, at 98-99.
259. Id. at 100.
260. See id. at 96 n.93. According to the Forensic Center, reference to alcohol or drug use in the psychiatrists' report underlying the Smith & Hall study
was made any time a defendant reported at least "occasional" use. Id. See also id.
at 111 (Appendix A, Table I showing types of drug use).
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contacts and prior criminal history by counting the number of
contacts and charges. 26 ' They did not differentiate the types of
psychiatric contacts-such as voluntary or involuntary, outpatient
or inpatient-or the charges that resulted in convictions. Important differences may exist between someone who voluntarily
sought family counseling at a community mental health center on
one occasion and someone who was involuntarily committed as
dangerous to himself or others. The number of previous criminal
charges filed should be used and interpreted carefully, realizing
that charges often do not result in convictions, as previously
noted. 2 62 Further, in response to Smith and Hall's scheme in
which offenders with three auto theft charges could be grouped
with those with one prior manslaughter charge, it might be enlightening to explore more fully the effect of the seriousness of
2 63
prior criminal activity.
Third, questions arise from the discriminant analysis Smith
and Hall used to address the displacement issue. The variables
and the analytical steps employed in their analysis may not fulfill
the underlying assumptions and requirements of the technique.
2 64
For example, Smith and Hall describe initial bivariate analyses,
yet do not indicate whether further analyses, such as examinations for spuriousness or intercorrelation among variables, were
conducted prior to the discriminant analysis. Further, discriminant analysis is a statistical technique for analyzing interval level
data. Typically, analysts using the technique can make adjust26 5
ments that provide reliable results when discrete data are used.
261. Id. at 110-11 (Appendix A, Tables H &J). These tables list numbers
of "prior criminal charges" and "previous psychiatric contacts" under GBMI,
NGRI, and guilty verdict headings.
262. Data collected from corrections files, at least data on prior felony convictions for which commitment occurred, might offer a useful, more direct measure of official criminal history, especially if supplemented by misdemeanor
conviction and probation records.
263. For a discussion of the effect of the severity of criminal activity on jury
decisionmaking, see infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
264. Project, supra note 10, at 95-96. These "two-way" analyses expressed
each variable used in the study (such as race, age, and education) in both real
numbers and percentages for each verdict group, in an attempt "to determine
which variables were most significant in differentiating between the verdicts."
Id. at 96-97. It is assumed that a chi-square test was used in these analyses. Chisquare is equal to the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing the square of
the difference between the observed and theoretical values of a quantity by the
theoretical value. SeeJ.L. BRUNING & B.L. KINTZ, COMPUTATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
STATISTIcs 207-09 (1968).
265. See M. GOLDSTEIN & W.R. DILLON, DISCRETE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
4-10 (1978), W. KLECKA, supra note 257.
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266
Smith and Hall describe no such adjustments in their analysis.
Smith and Hall did note that their displacement analysis
might be suspect if the post-GBMI population of NGRI acquittees
were different from the pre-GBMI population. 2 6 7 Relying upon
earlier research, however, Smith and Hall presumed that defendants acquitted on the basis of insanity between 1975 and 1979
were "quite similar" to those acquitted between 1967 and
1972.268 Our examination of the data produced by that earlier
research, particularly that of Cooke and Sikorski, 2 69 reveals that
2 70
the study populations did differ in several significant ways.
If the GBMI laws have displaced NGRI defendants, one
might expect a change in the NGRI population as a result. Comparison of the data presented by Cooke and Sikorski 27 ' and Criss
and Racine 2 72 suggests that at least some of the less seriously disturbed and more violent offenders may have been screened out of
the NGRI population as a result of the availability of the GBMI
alternative in Michigan. In addition, changes may have occurred
in the racial composition and mental health diagnoses of the same

266.
267.
268.
269.

See Project, supra note 10, at 96-100.
Id. at 96 n.98.
Id. (citing Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 263).
Cooke & Sikorski, Factors Affecting Length of Hospitalizationin Persons Adjudicated Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 251
(1974).
270. See Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 263-69; Cooke & Sikorski, supra
note 261, at 252-59. The table set forth below uses the Cooke & Sikorski and
Criss & Racine studies to demonstrate the changes in the NGRI study populations from 1967-1972 to 1975-1979.
Cooke and Sikorski
(1967-1972)

Criss and Racine
(1975-1979)

Comments

i)

32.3% of the NGRI
population was black

44.8% of the NGRI
population was black

2)

45.5% had prior
psychiatric
hospitalizations

65.9% had prior
psychiatric
hospitalizations

3)

59.9% were acquitted
of murder

29.6% were acquitted
of murder

Suggests that the insanity defense is
being utilized for wider range of
offenses. Also, women comprised 15%
of Criss and Racine's study population
yet 30% of those acquitted of murder.

4)

24.5% diagnosed as
having personality
disorders

21.8% diagnosed as
having personality
disorders

The aggregate data mask the fact that
the number of acquittees diagnosed as
having personality disorders decreased
from 43.8% in 1975 to 12.2% in 1979.

The 13.9% decrease among whites and
similar increase among blacks reported
by Criss and Racine apparently resulted
from subtracting percentages across
populations rather than calculating a
percentage change.

271. Cooke & Sikorski, supra note 269, at 253-54.
272. Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 265, 268-69.
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population. 2 73
The design of additional research in this area would be
strengthened by incorporating psychiatric diagnosis as an independent variable and by including pre- and post-GBMI groups
for purposes of comparison. The displacement question once
again highlights the need to examine competing explanations of
observed effects.
In summary, the data from Smith and Hall's Michigan study
suggest that the GBMI laws have not displaced offenders as proponents expected. However, such data are formative, not necessarily conclusive. Conclusions based on data from Michigan may
not generalize to other states. In addition, statistical questions
about the analysis employed may require replication of the findings. Finally, a more complex and comprehensive research design is necessary to consider and possibly refute competing
hypotheses.
C. Effect on the CriminalJustice Process
Although a major purpose of GBMI legislation is to protect
society by incarcerating defendants who might otherwise be released following NGRI findings, proponents of such legislation
also have intended that the GBMI plea and verdict simplify criminal proceedings. For example, supporters of GBMI legislation
2 74
suggested that it would greatly simplify jury deliberations.
This section explores the limited research regarding whether the
GBMI plea and verdict does simplify criminal proceedings, and
poses questions that might be addressed in future research.
1. Plea Bargaining
If an insanity acquittal appears unlikely, plea bargaining may
result in a GBMI plea. 2 75 A defendant may agree to a GBMI plea
273. For a chart examining some of these changes, see supra note 270.
274. See MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ANALYSIS SECTION, THIRD
ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363 3, 78th Leg., July 15, 1975. See also Robey, supra
note 6, at 378 (Michigan GBMI statute enables trier of fact to distinguish between exculpable defendants and those whose mental illness is ancillary to crime
committed).
275. Stelzner & Piatt, supra note 21, at 101. Stelzner and Piatt discuss New
Mexico's GBMI statute, which requires that before a court may accept defendant's GBMI plea, the court must "receive psychological or psychiatric reports on
the defendant, hold a hearing and satisfy itself that 'there is a factual basis that
the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense.' " Id. (quoting N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(c) (1984)). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(a)
(West 1982) (judge may not accept GBMI plea unless satisfied that defendant
was mentally ill at the time of the offense).
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because he or she expects mental treatment or believes that a
GBMI finding might result in more advantageous sentencing than
a guilty finding.2 76 Whether such expectations are reasonable has
yet to be tested.
Based on a limited survey of attorneys that had handled
GBMI cases, 2 77 Smith and Hall found that 61% (N = 36) of GBMI
findings in Michigan were obtained through plea bargains. 2 78 Because many criminal cases are resolved regularly through plea
bargaining, this finding is not surprising. That such a large proportion of GBMI findings result from pleas before judges, however, appears to be an unintended result, since GBMI literature
suggests that legislators primarily intended to provide juries,
rather than judges, with an alternative finding. 279 Thus, the role
of plea bargaining in obtaining a GBMI finding ought to be examined systematically. Such an examination should include the
frequency with which such bargaining occurs and the effect it has
on sentencing.
2.

Involvement of PsychiatricExperts

The widespread use of psychiatrists and psychologists as expert witnesses and the often confusing, technical nature of their
testimony have spawned considerable opposition to the insanity
defense. Criticism has focused on two major concerns: (1) the
imprecise methods upon which such testimony is based; and
(2) the perceived tendency of mental health experts to usurp the
280
function of the judge or jury by providing conclusory opinions.
One purpose of GBMI legislation is to rectify these problems
by reducing the involvement of mental health experts. One authority has suggested that the availability of the GBMI verdict
might serve to ease the pressure on psychiatrists to force mental
health diagnoses into strict legal categories inappropriately.2 8 '
Others have suggested, however, that instead of reducing the involvement of psychiatric experts, the GBMI verdict perpetuates
2 82
and in fact expands their involvement.
276. Petrella, supra note 249, at 4-5; Robey, supra note 6, at 379-80;
Stelzner & Piatt, supra note 21, at 101.
277. See Project, supra note 10, at 93 n.73.
278. Id. at 94, 108 (Appendix A, Table C).
279.
as juries.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 94. In practice, judges appear to use the finding as frequently
Id.
I. KEILITZ &J.P. FULTON, supra note 22, at 18.
See Bank, supra note 240, at 4.
Hermann & Sor, Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity
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Smith and Hall surveyed 36 attorneys who represented defendants found GBMI and 38 attorneys who represented defendants found NGRI. They concluded that mental health experts
were involved significantly in both NGRI and GBMI cases in
Michigan. 28 3 More specifically, their findings indicated that NGRI
defendants "may characteristically be more reliant upon expert
testimony in bench trials" than are GBMI defendants, and that
"both NGRI and GBMI defendants rely heavily upon testimony
from private psychiatrists in the absence of Forensic Center
'28 4
testimony.
Methodological limitations, however, restrict the ability to
generalize from Smith and Hall's findings. First, the attorney
samples were small. Second, the effect of the Forensic Center testimony on the verdicts was not assessed; rather, the effect of the
Forensic Center's pretrial evaluation recommendations were analyzed. Third, the sample of attorneys was skewed because no attorney who unsuccessfully represented his or her client was
included. 2 85 Consequently, no data were presented on the use of
expert testimony in cases in which defendants were found guilty
after raising the insanity defense.
In sum, although Smith and Hall assessed the influence of
Michigan's Center for Forensic Psychiatry, they shed little light on
the impact that the GBMI plea and verdict have had on the involvement of mental health experts in general. To determine
whether the use of mental health experts has decreased as a result
of GBMI legislation, pre- and post-GBMI comparisons need to be
made. Once these comparisons are completed, the effects of such
expert involvement on the finding, treatment, and length of confinement in GBMI cases will remain to be examined.
3.

Bench Versus Jury Trials
A secondary purpose of the GBMI verdict is to simplify jury

Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquittees,
1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 499, 572-73.
283. See Project, supra note 10, at 93 n.73, 94-95.
284. Id. at 95. See also id at 108 (Appendix A, Table D-Use of Expert Psychiatric Witnesses in NGRI and GBMI Trials). As described by Smith and Hall,
to be found GBMI or NGRI, a defendant must plead insanity and undergo a
psychiatric examination at Michigan's Forensic Center. Id.at 94. A Forensic
Center examiner then will testify for or against the defendant's NGRI acquittal
at trial. Id.
285. Id. at 93 n.73.
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deliberations. 2 86 Smith and Hall, again, provide the only published findings in this area. Their data, which are based on the
survey responses of 74 defense attorneys, align information on
the case outcomes (GBMI and NGRI) with the method of adjudication employed (plea, bench trial, or jury trial). Smith and Hall
concluded that "defendants found GBMI after trial were evenly
divided between bench and jury trials." 28 7 Whetherjuries tend to
find defendants GBMI rather than NGRI cannot, however, be determined simply by counting the methods of adjudication or comparing raw frequencies of jury outcomes. 2 88 In an attempt to
make a determination, we conducted a chi-square test using
Smith and Hall's data. Our calculations 28 9 indicate that the proportion of defendants found NGRI in bench trials (89%) was significantly greater than those found GBMI in bench trials (50%).
Furthermore, the proportion of defendants that juries determined to be NGRI (11%) was significantly smaller than the proportion of those found GBMI (50%). A statistically significant
286. See id. at 94 n.33, 93; Petrella, supra note 249, at 4; Robey, supra note 6,
at 378.
287. Project, supra note 10, at 94.
288. See Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 577.
289. Excluding defendants who pleaded GBMI (we have already addressed
the plea bargaining issue and focus here solely on bench and jury trials), and
accepting Smith and Hall's contention that NGRI acquittals are not reached
through plea bargaining, Smith and Hall's data can be presented as follows:
Type of Trial
Verdict

Bench

Jury

GBMI (N= 14)

7 (17%)
7 (64%)
[50%]
[50%]
[100%]
NGRI (N=38)
34 (83%)
4 (36%)
[89%]
[11%]
[100%]
41 (100%)
11 (100%)
[
Indicates row percentages.
Indicates column percentages.
X2 = 8.863
df = 1
p< 0 1
See Project, supra note 10, at 108 (Appendix A, Table C). Correction for continuity was made during calculation due to the small cell sizes. The above table
is presented according to the logic of causal relationships among variables to
increase interpretative value. As displayed, the data suggest that the type of trial
affects the verdict rendered. Conversely, many tables that Smith and Hall
presented suggest that the verdict affects age, crime location, prior criminal
charges, and so forth. Id. at 109-13. This effect makes interpretation difficult
and ignores the time sequence relevant to possible causal relationships. See E.
BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 382-87 (1983); H.M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (rev. 2d ed. 1979). See also Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at
576-78; Stelzner & Piatt, supra note 21, at 110.
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difference exists in the proportion of individuals found GBMI as
opposed to NGRI by type of trial, suggesting a relationship between type of trial and finding. A larger sample and further analysis examining the effect of other variables on the relationship
would be required, however, before one could draw conclusions.
Smith and Hall's data may well support Hermann and Sor's hypothesis that juries tend to find defendants who raise the insanity
2 90
defense GBMI rather than NGRI.
4. Jury Decisionmaking
Juries torn between an NGRI verdict, with its perceived
threat to public safety, and the standard guilty verdict may view
the GBMI verdict as an attractive compromise. 29 ' A jury may
either intentionally use the GBMI verdict when it is unable to
reach a consensus on whether an NGRI verdict or a GBMI verdict
is appropriate, or it may mistakenly use it because of confusion
2 92
over the meaning of the two verdicts.
The potential for "jury compromise" has been discussed by a
number of commentators. Several authorities have suggested
that instructions to the jury regarding dispositional consequences
may contribute to compromise verdicts.2 93 According to Fullin
and Fosdal, for example, jurors believe that an individual found
GBMI will serve a specified sentence in prison but that an insanity
acquittee may be released depending on the outcome of a posttrial evaluation. 294 Petrella 29 5 as well as Hermann and Sor 2 9 6
have hypothesized that if jurors believe a defendant found GBMI
will receive treatment, a GBMI finding is more likely. Therefore,
jurors may opt for the GBMI verdict based on the perception that
psychiatric treatment will be combined with incarceration. The
GBMI verdict, then, is perceived as achieving the dual objectives
of promising treatment and ensuring the defendant's segregation
from society.
In a recent study, Roberts and Golding simulated jurors'
290. See Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 565, 571.
291. See Stelzner & Piatt, supra note 21, at 110; Note, GBMI, supra note 21,
at 469.
292. Note, supra note 21, at 469.
293. See id.; Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 571.
294. J. Fullin & F. Fosdal, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Disposition,
Memorandum to Insanity Defense Committee 10-11, Wisconsin Judicial Council
(Sept. 12, 1980) (unpublished memorandum).
295. Petrella, supra note 249, at 5.
296. Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 571.
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decisonmaking by asking 181 undergraduate students attending
the University of Illinois to choose among the verdicts of NGRI,
guilty, and GBMI in response to 16 vignettes describing the facts
and circumstances of a. murder case. 29 7 Each of the vignettes included the same description of a fictious victim and the circumstances of his life but varied in the description of the defendant's
mental disorder and the alleged crime. Three types of mental
disorder were represented, although without diagnostic labels:
antisocial personality disorder, schizotypal personality disorder,
and paranoid schizophrenia. The alleged crime varied in "bizarreness" (in the bizarre version, the victim's heart is cut out; in
the "nonbizarre" version, the victim dies of a stab wound) and
"planfulness," two aspects of a crime that Golding and Roberts
298
hypothesized are emphasized by jurors.
To assess the effect of various decisional alternatives on the
verdicts reached, students were asked to consider the "facts of the
case" presented by the vignettes under two conditions. In Condition I they could choose only between the two traditional verdicts
of guilty and NGRI; in Condition II they could choose among
guilty, NGRI, and GBMI.
The results of the study indicate that jurors' attribution of
criminal responsibility is, not surprisingly, fundamentally related
to the severity of a defendant's mental disorder and, in a more
complex manner, to aspects of the actus reus. Regardless of
whether the students had GBMI among their verdict choices,
more schizophrenic defendants were judged NGRI than were the
defendants with "less severe" mental disorders (i.e., antisocial or
schizotypal personalities).2 9 9 Though not unrelated to the mental
disorder of the defendant, and depending upon whether GBMI
was among the verdict options, the students' attribution of criminal responsibility tended to be greater the more the defendant
deliberately planned his actions and the more bizarre the crime.
An overwhelming majority of the students (86%) believed
297. See C.F. Roberts & S.L. Golding, An Empirical Analysis of the Attribution of Criminal and Moral Responsibility Under the "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
Option (1984) (available from Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign) (unpublished manuscript). The study was also reported in C.F.
Roberts & S.L. Golding, Insanity, Responsibility, and the Morality of Guilty But
Mentally Ill (paper delivered during Paper Session, The Insanity Defense: Public Opinion and Public Policy, at the Meeting of the American Psychological
Ass'n in Toronto, Canada, Aug. 25, 1984).
298. See Golding & Roberts, supra note 6, at 3-4. See also Roberts & Golding, supra note 297.
299. Golding & Roberts, supra note 6, at 11.
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that the "GBMI sentencing alternative was moral, just, and an adequate means of providing for the treatment needs of mentally ill
offenders." 30 0 This sentiment was reflected in their verdicts. The
students were two-and-one-half times more likely to use the
GBMI verdict than either the guilty or NGRI verdict. Those who
chose the GBMI verdict also tended to be more confident in their
choice. 30 1 The more disordered defendants were more likely to
be found GBMI than guilty. The same was true for the defend30 2
ants who committed crimes in a bizarre fashion.
When given the GBMI option in Condition II, the students
tended to find GBMI most of those defendants with personality
disorders who were adjudged guilty in Condition 1.303 This displacement effect is consistent with the results of Smith and Hall's
study of actual cases in Michigan. 30 4 Displacement of guilty verdicts with GBMI verdicts between Condition I and II, however,
did not occur in cases involving defendants with severe disorders,
"such as in the prototypic insanity vignette where an obvious
paranoid schizophrenic individual with delusion related to the
victim is combined with a relative lack of planfulness.1 30 5 Ninetyfive percent of the students found such a defendant NGRI when
GBMI was not a sentencing option available to them; however,
when the GBMI option was available, only 18% of the students
found the same defendant NGRI, while 77% found him GBMI. 30 6
Hence, GBMI verdicts displaced NGRI findings. Apparently,
most of the subjects of Golding and Roberts' study, like Queen
Victoria a hundred years ago, considered it just to attribute criminal guilt even to a psychotic defendant whose unplanned offense
30 7
was caused by a delusional system.
This displacement of NGRI acquittals with GBMI verdicts,
although generally consistent with the purposes of GBMI legislation, is in contrast to the data collected in Michigan, where NGRI
acquittals appear undisturbed by the availability of the GBMI al300. Id. at 12.
301. Id. at 11-12.

302. Id. at 11.
303. Id. at Figure 3.
304. For a discussion of Smith and Hall's displacement study, see supra
notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
305. Golding & Roberts, supra note 6, at 12.
306. Id.
307. For a discussion of Queen Victoria's view, see supra note I and accompanying text.
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ternative. 30 8 One possible explanation of this difference, mentioned by Golding and Roberts,3 0 9 is that the data collected by
Smith and Hall in Michigan represent findings reached primarily
by bench trials or plea bargains and based on mental health evaluations performed by Michigan's Center for Forensic Psychiatry,
rather than findings reached by students simulating jurors' decisionmaking. Given the relative rarity of NGRI acquittals in Michigan, another explanation for this difference may be that few
actual NGRI verdicts existed to displace in Michigan. This also is
a plausible explanation for Golding and Roberts' failure to find a
shift from NGRI to GBMI verdicts in cases involving defendants
31 0
with personality disorders.
In what is perhaps the most comprehensive study on jury
decisionmaking in insanity cases concluded before enactment of
GBMI legislation, 3 1' Simon suggests that the compromise provided by the then unavailable GBMI verdict is precisely what jurors desire:
Many of the jurors [studied] felt constrained by the verdict limitations placed upon them by the court. They
would like to have a way of easing the choice between
acquitting the defendant on grounds of insanity and
finding him guilty. The former designation goes further
than they want to go in distinguishing the defendant
from the ordinary criminal, and the latter allows for no
distinction. In many instances the jury would have liked
to declare the defendant guilty, but insane. That kind of
verdict would permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior . . . [and fulfill]. . . their desire to commit the defendant to an institution that both punished
312
and treated.
If jurors base their decisions on public safety concerns and
their belief that needed treatment will be provided, instead of on
the legal requirements for insanity and nonresponsibility, defendants who qualify for NGRI acquittals may be denied legally appropriate findings. 31 3 Robey reviewed 57 Michigan GBMI cases,
308. For a discussion of displacement in Michigan, see supra notes 233-41
and accompanying text.
309. See Golding & Roberts, supra note 6, at 10-11.
310. See id. at Figure 3.
311. R. SIMON, supra note 36.
312. Id. at 1780.
313. See Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 517; Note, GBMI, supra note 21,
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however, and concluded that only two GBMI convicts were denied insanity acquittals improperly because jurors feared possible
release following an NGRI finding.3 1 4 Robey, however, presents
neither the criteria used in his review nor the basis for his
conclusion.
In her studies of jury decisionmaking published in 1967, Simon found that instructions regarding the dispositional consequences of an NGRI finding do not significantly affect a jury's
choice between NGRI and guilty verdicts.3 1 5 It remains to be
seen how this relationship is affected by availability of the GBMI
verdict.
5.

Sentencing

No reported data focus on the effect a GBMI finding has on
the sentence imposed. Whether the adjudication of mental illness
as part of a GBMI finding shortens or lengthens an offender's
sentence may be answered by comparing the sentences imposed
on offenders found GBMI and guilty after raising the insanity defense with the sentences imposed on defendants who did not
raise the insanity defense but were convicted of comparable
crimes. The results may be similar to those reported by Braff and
her colleagues, who found that defendants found guilty after entering NGRI pleas received significantly longer sentences than
those who had not asserted the defense.3 1 6 Interestingly, defendants who plead NGRI risk a greater chance of being institutionalized, regardless of whether their plea is successful, than
31 7
defendants who never enter the plea.

at 470-71 (jury should be instructed to focus upon defendant's mental condition
only in evaluating his culpability, not in considering collateral issues).
314. Robey, supra note 6, at 380.
315. R. SIMON, supra note 36, at 92-93. The validity of this finding has been
questioned. See Morris, Bozzetti, Rusk & Read, Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry
IntoJurors'Perceptionsof the Consequencesof a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1058, 1060-61 (1977); Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed of the Consequences of the Insanity Verdict?, 8J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 167, 174 (1980).
316. Braff, Arvanites & Steadman, Detention Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1983). See also Rodriguez,
LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RuTGERs L.J. 397, 401-02 & n.32 (1983).
317. Braff, Arvanites & Steadman, supra note 316, at 446. But cf Pasewark,
Pantle & Steadman, Detention and Rearrest Rates of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and Convicted Felons, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 892, 893-94 (1982)
(hospitalization time for NGRI acquittees in New York was the same as imprisonment periods of felons who had pleaded guilty to the same criminal act between 1965 and 1971, but between 1971 and 1973 acquittees were confined for
shorter periods (533 days) than felons convicted of similar offenses (837 days)).
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Generally, a sentencing judge may impose any sentence on a
GBMI defendant that could be imposed on a guilty defendant.3 18
At least one commentator has suggested that the provision of
probation following a GBMI finding may offer advantages both to
the public and to the defendant that an NGRI verdict does not
offer. 319 If an NGRI acquittal is likely in a particular case, a prosecutor may wish to offer GBMI conviction and probation with
treatment in a plea bargain. A defendant may view such an offer
as acceptable because favorable disposition is assured. The public may favor GBMI conviction with probation over NGRI acquittal because of the assurance of some protection during a period
of mandatory treatment and supervision of the defendant by the
criminal justice system. 320 How frequently courts grant probation
and what factors influence the granting of probation to GBMI offenders, however, have not yet been determined.
D.

Disposition of the GBMI Offender

1. Provision of Treatment
Despite the widespread belief that a GBMI finding guarantees an offender mental health treatment, a review of the relevant
statutes 32 ' indicates that the finding does not ensure treatment
beyond that available to other offenders. Most GBMI statutes,
3 22
with the possible exceptions of the Alaska and Utah statutes,
give discretion to the correctional or mental health facility having
custody of the offender to provide treatment "as it deems necessary" or "as is psychiatrically indicated." 3 23 The Georgia statute
includes the caveat that treatment shall be provided "within the
limits of state funds appropriated therefore." 3 24 As a statutory
matter, therefore, GBMI offenders may be no more likely to re3 25
ceive treatment than other offenders.
There are several possible explanations for the difference between the number of GBMI offenders determined to be mentally
318. For a discussion of sentencing procedures in the eleven states with
GBMI statutes examined in this article, see Table 3.
319. See Robey, supra note 6, at 379.
320. Id.
321. For an analysis of the special procedural GBMI provisions in the
twelve states under consideration in this article, see Table 3.
322. For an analysis of the Alaska and Utah statutes, see Table 3.
323. See id.
324. GA. CODE ANN. § 17 -7 -131(g) (Supp. 1984).
325. See Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 578-79; Project, supra note 10,
at 105 n.137.
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ill during criminal proceedings and the number of those who actually receive treatment after conviction. Generally, a GBMI finding is based on mental illness at the time of the offense, 32 6 while
postconviction mental health evaluation focuses on an offender's
present mental health treatment needs.3 2 7 The diagnoses of
mental disorder may change over time as a function of changes in
the offender's condition or environment, as well as differences in
the policies and practices of pre- and postconviction mental
health evaluations. Another explanation, which may be related to
the first, is based upon research showing that mental health treatment received by NGRI acquittees during pretrial detention following a finding of incompetence to stand trial may result in a
reduced need for treatment after an NGRI acquittal.3 2 8 Likewise,
in the case of GBMI offenders, treatment under similar circumstances may result in an improvement in an offender's mental
condition and a decreased need for treatment following conviction. 3 29 A third possible explanation is that some defendants entering GBMI pleas, especially when such pleas are unchallenged
by the prosecution, may not be treatable or may not need treatment. Finally, treatment simply may be unavailable to GBMI of33 0
fenders in the correctional system.
Adding the GBMI alternative to the traditional array of verdicts may mislead offenders, their attorneys, the courts, and the
public by building false treatment expectations. 33' A review of the
frequency of treatment provided to GBMI offenders and the nature of that treatment is necessary to determine whether legislative revisions or additional appropriations for treatment are
needed. Variables that might influence the provision of postconviction treatment, including pretrial treatment, correctional resources, and the use and effect of transfer provisions, should also
326. But see Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983) (court must determine if defendant is "currently mentally ill").
327. See Petrella, supra note 249, at 8.
328. See Criss & Racine, supra note 239, at 266.
329. Petrella, supra note 249, at 8.
330. See People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 667-68 n.5, 288 N.W.2d 909,
921 n.5 (1980) (Levin, J., concurring). A psychiatrist in the Michigan Department of Corrections, the only full-time psychiatrist for a prison population of
12,000 in 1980, indicated that he attended to offenders only if they presented
extreme management problems. Treatment generally was provided only to patients who were psychotic or suicidal, and it consisted mainly of crisis intervention. Id. See also Project, supra note 10, at 89 n.49. For a further discussion of
the lack of treatment for GBMI offenders, see supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
331. See Fullin & Fosdal, supra note 294, at 10-11.
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be examined. This research should be structured to allow for
comparisons among states.
2.

Length of Confinement and Release

No available data address how long GBMI offenders are incarcerated or how their confinement compares with: (1) that of
offenders found guilty who did not raise the insanity defense;
(2) that of offenders who raised the insanity defense or pleaded
GBMI but were found guilty; and (3) the length of hospitalization
of NGRI acquittees. In Erie County, New York, Braff and her associates found no statistically significant difference in the length
of institutionalization between defendants hospitalized following
an insanity acquittal and those incarcerated after unsuccessfully
raising an insanity defense.3 3 2 It is possible that this finding may
not be supported in a comparison among GBMI offenders and
the three groups noted above.
Factors related to the release of GBMI offenders into the
community are of obvious interest to policymakers. Confinement
for a specified period in the name of societal protection was an
underlying objective in the creation of the GBMI finding.3 3 3 In
most states, GBMI offenders do not face the prospect of indefinite commitment33 4 that insanity acquittees may face.3 3 5 Unlike
NGRI acquittees, however, GBMI offenders cannot petition for
release. 33 6 Exploration of such differences may provide valuable
information on the GBMI laws' success regarding punishment
and public protection.
The effect on recidivism of mental health treatment provided
GBMI offenders is particularly important to policymakers and
practitioners. Treatment provided during incarceration may facilitate an offender's successful return to society. Hermann and
Sor have hypothesized that mentally ill offenders may be more
332. See Braff, Arvanities & Steadman, supra note 316, at 443-44. For a discussion of Braff's study, see supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that Braff and her associates were unable to draw conclusions
concerning any variations among misdemeanants due to the small size of the
population.
333. For a discussion of this objective, see supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
334. But cf. ALsKA STAT. § 12.47.050(e) (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-2-6(d)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1982); MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 330.2006(3)
(West 1980), § 768.36(3) (West 1982) (authorizing initiation of involuntary civil
commitment at expiration of sentence).
335. SeeJones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051 (1983) (such indefinite commitment not violative of due process).
336. Petrella, supra note 249, at 2.
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violent following release from prison if they have not received
mental health treatment. 337 Also important are the effects of parole decisions and a state's sentencing structure on the release of
GBMI offenders.
Recidivism and public safety may best be studied using data
collected in Michigan. The enactment of GBMI legislation in
other states may be too recent for the collection of any meaningful data on recidivism.
V.

CONCLUSION

Guilt, mental illness, and insanity are characterizations of behavior, but they also reflect the differences among proposals
about how to handle persons so characterized. Traditionally, the
guilty are punished and the mentally ill are treated. Good intentions aside, it is difficult to do both. The struggle with this moral
dilemma and the practical problems it entails are reflected in the
legislative and judicial developments of the GBMI plea and verdict reviewed in this article. Despite widespread criticism from
scholars and professionals that the GBMI alternative is ill-conceived, constitutionally unsound, redundant, and unnecessary in
practice, and despite early returns from social science research
suggesting that the laws do little to undercut the traditional insanity defense, and do even less to enhance available treatment
options for mentally disordered offenders, the GBMI laws seem
to be alive and well in at least twelve states. They have survived
constitutional attacks in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Georgia,
and seem likely to overcome similar challenges in other states.
While "first-generation" substantive issues, such as the conceptual soundness and constitutional validity of the GBMI plea
and verdict, will remain controversial, "second-generation" issues3 38 that deal with procedures and practices are likely to be

preeminent as the focus of attention moves from legislative and
judicial mandates to that which has actually been accomplished by
337. Hermann & Sor, supra note 282, at 582-83.
338. See D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAw: MAJOR ISSUES 257-61 (1981).
These second generation issues include: (1) accomplishing effective deinstitutionalization and avoiding merely "dumping" patients into substandard boarding homes; (2) upgrading and enforcing standards for nursing homes and
board-and-care facilities; (3) dealing with zoning laws that exclude group homes
for the mentally disabled from certain areas and attempt to concentrate these
homes in "social service ghettoes"; (4) combatting practices of discrimination in
housing, education, and employment among the mentally ill; and (5) dealing
with mentally disabled individuals who are not well integrated into society, and
who consequently confront the criminal justice system periodically. Id. at 257.
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those mandates. 33 9 As Professor David B. Wexler has noted, "policy makers are perhaps most likely to become informed of actual
practices and of workable alternatives by mental health law scholars and students who undertake empirical investigations of
mental health law in operation and who compare and contrast the
workings of one system with the workings of alternative systems
3 40
in operation elsewhere."
339. See generally Shah, supra note 231, at 255.
340. D. WEXLER, supra note 338, at 260.
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